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NEGOTIATING JURISDICTION: RETROCEDING STATE
AUTHORITY OVER INDIAN COUNTRY GRANTED BY
PUBLIC LAW 280
Robert T. Anderson
Abstract: This Article canvasses the jurisdictional rules applicable in American Indian
tribal territories—“Indian country.” The focus is on a federal law passed in the 1950s, which
granted some states a measure of jurisdiction over Indian country without tribal consent. The
law is an aberration. Since the adoption of the Constitution, federal law preempted state
authority over Indians in their territory. The federal law permitting some state jurisdiction,
Public Law 280, is a relic of a policy repudiated by every President and Congress since 1970.
States have authority to surrender, or retrocede, the authority granted by Public Law 280, but
Indian tribal governments should be allowed to determine whether and when state
jurisdiction should be limited or removed.
The Public Law 280 legislation was approved by Congress in the face of strenuous
Indian opposition and denied consent of the Indian tribes affected by the Act . . . .The
Indian community viewed the passage of Public Law 280 as an added dimension to the
dreaded termination policy. Since the inception of its passage the statute has been
criticized and opposed by tribal leaders throughout the Nation. The Indians allege that
the Act is deficient in that it failed to fund the States who assumed jurisdiction and as a
result vacuums of law enforcement have occurred in certain Indian reservations and
communities. They contend further that the Act has resulted in complex jurisdictional
problems for Federal, State and tribal governments.
S. COMM. ON THE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND REP. ON
PUBLIC LAW 280 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman).
Senator Jackson’s statement accurately described the issues then and now. This Article
reviews the legal history of federal-tribal-state relations in the context of Public Law 280
jurisdiction. Washington State has recently taken progressive steps that could serve as the
foundation for a national model to remove state jurisdiction as a tribal option. The modern
Indian self-determination policy is not advanced by adherence to termination era experiments
like Public Law 280. The Article concludes that federal legislation should provide for a
tribally-driven retrocession model and makes proposals to that end.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States was founded upon the principle of the “consent of
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the governed,”1 although this proposition has dubious validity with
respect to Indian tribes and their citizens. Despite early respect for tribal
sovereignty and complete independence from state jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court recognized nearly unlimited power in Congress to
unilaterally alter the jurisdictional arrangements in tribal territories.2
This power over Indian tribes and their territory was exercised without
the meaningful consent of the affected tribes, and thus is morally
suspect.3 Nevertheless, Congress utilized its authority to assert federal
control of criminal matters in Indian country, and later to authorize some
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes and their territories.
In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 (P.L. 280),4 which required
six states to assert jurisdiction over Indian country, and opened the door
for other states to do the same if they wished.5 It provided no role for the
affected tribes in state decisions to assert jurisdiction. The unilateral
imposition of state jurisdiction has long been regarded as offensive to
tribal governments and Indian people because the states, as opposed to
the federal government, in many ways remain the “deadliest enemies” of
the tribes.6 In 1963, Washington State asserted jurisdiction over Indian
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people, and
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to
protect and maintain individual rights.”); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the
governed.”).
2. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Georgia has no jurisdiction over
non-Indians within Cherokee Reservation), with United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
371, 415 (1980) (“[T]ribal lands are subject to Congress’ power to control and manage the tribe’s
affairs. But the court must also be cognizant that ‘this power to control and manage [is] not
absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is]
subject to limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.’”).
See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (“Long ago the Court
departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a state] can have no force’ within
reservation boundaries . . . . ”) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520). See generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01, at 499–514 (Nell J. Newton, Robert Anderson et al.
eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. The 2012 edition of COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW was released as this Article was in the final editing stages. While the page numbering has
changed, most of the section numbers remain the same and are included here for ease of reference.
3. For a detailed examination of these consent principles, see Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent
to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989), and Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45 (2012).
4. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588.
5. Id.
6. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“Because of the local ill feeling, the
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country and Indian people in a complex fashion that bewilders all who
enter the jurisdictional maze.7 This assumption of state jurisdiction
ignores the democratic consent principle and is inconsistent with modern
policies promoting tribal self-determination.8 The separate sovereign
status of tribes, manifested in the commerce clause of the Constitution9
and the foundational decisions of the Supreme Court,10 supports
continued recognition of tribal territories as areas where tribal law is
paramount to the exclusion of state law. However, recognizing that
Congress and the Supreme Court have in fact frequently authorized the
assertion of state authority, Indian tribes are positioned as supplicants to
Congress, or the states themselves, when requesting that state
jurisdiction over Indian country be withdrawn—or retroceded. Indeed,
some states view their jurisdiction over Indian country as the historic
norm when in fact it is a relatively recent development.
This Article outlines the legal history of federal-tribal relations,
primarily in the criminal jurisdiction context, and examines in some
detail the congressional authorization of state jurisdiction over Indian
country nationwide and in the Washington-specific context. It reveals
the extreme complexity of civil and criminal jurisdiction over
Washington’s Indian country, and describes recent progressive state
legislation that provides tribes with a path to remove state authority,
albeit dependent on the good will of the Governor of the state. The
Article next reviews several options for adjusting state and tribal
jurisdiction in the areas governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act and
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. It concludes with the
recommendation that Congress provide a tribally-driven option for
removing state jurisdiction over Indian country. There should be a
process of negotiation and information sharing with the states that
obtained this non-consensual jurisdiction, but in the end a tribal request
for the retrocession of state jurisdiction should be between the affected
Indian tribe and the United States. The process should provide an
opportunity for interest-based discussions to ensure that the exercise of
criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country is carried out in a way

people of the states where they [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
7. The Supreme Court upheld this complex arrangement in Washington v. Confederated Bands
and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
8. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 97–113.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1577–81 (1996) (describing the
foundational principles of federal Indian law).
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that best serves all citizens.
Part I of this Article provides historical context for the modern
jurisdictional rules applicable to Indian tribes and their territory. Part II
explains the baseline criminal and civil jurisdictional rules that operate
in Indian country. Part III outlines the manner and scope of P.L. 280’s
jurisdictional grant to the states. Part IV reviews how Washington
asserted jurisdiction under P.L. 280, and reveals the complex
jurisdictional scheme. Part V details the state legislation that became
effective in June 2012, and established a process for the elimination of
some or all state jurisdiction upon the request of an affected Indian tribe.
Part VI explores the legal and policy issues implicated in what is
essentially a negotiation of federal, tribal, and state sovereignty under
P.L. 280’s framework. It also suggests approaches to federal legislation
to guide the process in a manner consistent with modern tribal selfdetermination policy.
I.

INDIAN TRIBES ARE SOVEREIGNS RECOGNIZED UNDER
FEDERAL LAW AND FREE OF STATE JURISDICTION
ABSENT TRIBAL AGREEMENT OR FEDERAL LAW TO THE
CONTRARY

The Indian Commerce Clause was included in the Constitution to
center authority over Indian affairs in Congress and to deny state
jurisdiction within Indian country absent some delegation from Congress
or common law rule. In Worcester v. Georgia,11 the Court rejected
Georgia’s assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian present
within the Cherokee Nation without a license required by state law.12
Chief Justice Marshall explained that Indian tribes were quasiindependent sovereigns not subject to state jurisdiction.13 Now, Indian
tribes, the federal government, and the states share authority within
Indian country as a result of treaties, federal statutes, and federal
common law. The modern definition of “Indian country,” found in the
federal criminal code, encompasses Indian reservations, allotments, and

11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. Id. at 559–61; see generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.01[2], at 501–03.
13. “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.” Worcester, 31
U.S. at 559–61. Earlier, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Court ruled
that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution and thus could not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge
Georgia’s laws purporting to regulate the Nation.
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dependent Indian communities.14 The Supreme Court later ruled that this
definition is also generally applicable in the civil context,15 though there
are many other definitions applicable in particular situations.16
Treaty negotiations with western tribes took place as the United States
gained new territory from foreign nations. Property used and occupied
by Indian nations could not be transferred except by treaties or other
agreements ratified by Congress.17 These tribal property rights were
based on aboriginal Indian occupancy18 and were said to be as “sacred as
the fee simple of the whites.”19 Three hundred and sixty-seven treaties
with Indian tribes were negotiated and ratified between 1778 and 1871.20
The treaties furthered peaceful relations with the tribes and provided
access to vast areas for non-Indian settlement.21 The United States
recognized permanent reservations, and, primarily in the upper-Midwest
and Pacific Northwest, the tribes reserved off-reservation hunting and
fishing rights.22 However, when non-Indians wanted to settle the land
previously “guaranteed” to the tribes by treaty, most of the “permanent”
tribal homelands were drastically reduced in size.23
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
15. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
16. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (surveying various
definitions of “reservation”).
17. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
18. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); see also COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 15.04[2], at 971 (“The Court described the tribal interest in land variously, as a ‘title of
occupancy,’ ‘right of occupancy,’ and right of possession . . . .”). The common shorthand term for
these property rights is “aboriginal title.” See Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 233–34 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669 n.5, 676 (1974).
19. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). Of course, the Supreme Court in
1955 created a gaping hole in the fabric of aboriginal title when it held that “unrecognized Indian
title” in southeast Alaska was not protected by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); see Joseph Singer,
Erasing Indian Country: The Story of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES 229 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
20. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES 1 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1850, ch. XVI, 9 Stat. 437 (authorizing the President “to appoint one
or more commissioners to negotiate treaties with the several Indian tribes in the Territory of
Oregon, for the extinguishment of their claims to lands lying west of the Cascade Mountains; and, if
found expedient and practicable, for their removal east of said mountains; also, for obtaining their
assent and submission to the existing laws regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes in
the other Territories and of the United States”).
22. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
23. For example, Congress confiscated the Black Hills of South Dakota through an “agreement”
that amounted to a taking of the tribe’s recognized title to the land in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377–83 (1980).
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The promise of permanent homelands also faded during the 1850s
when the Senate ratified treaties with tribes that authorized the breakup
of tribal lands into individual “allotments.”24 The federal retreat from the
consent model increased when Congress ended treaty-making in 1871.25
The policy of ending the reservation system culminated with the
adoption of the General Allotment Act,26 which reduced the Indian land
base from 156 million acres in 1881 to approximately forty-eight million
acres in 1934.27 Congress returned to the public domain lands that were
considered “surplus” to Indian needs.28 While previous reservations were
generally under exclusive tribal ownership, the new policies allowed an
influx of non-Indians within reservation boundaries. This resulted in a
checkerboard pattern of land ownership within reservations and
introduced many of today’s vexing jurisdictional problems.29
Congress returned to earlier policies that supported protection of
Indian land with the adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in
1934.30 The IRA “halted further allotments and extended indefinitely the
existing periods of trust applicable to already allotted (but not yet feepatented) Indian lands.”31 This return to support of tribal selfgovernment and a secure Indian land base was short-lived, however, as
less than twenty years later, Congress adopted a resolution calling for the

24. See Treaty with the Duwamish et al., art. 7, 12 Stat. 927 (1855); Treaty with the Omahas, art.
1, 10 Stat. 1043 (1854).
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)) (“No
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty . . . .”). Existing treaty rights were not impaired. Id. The United States continued to negotiate
agreements with Indian tribes, which were then ratified by Congress. See, e.g., Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (construing agreement with the tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation).
26. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. The Dawes Act gave the President
authority to divide communal tribal lands into individual parcels to be held by tribal members.
These “allotments” were protected from taxation and could not be sold without the consent of the
Secretary of the Interior for a period of twenty-five years. After that they were to be held in fee
simple status. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.04, at 75–84.
27. COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.04, at 78–79.
28. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
29. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Judith V.
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
30. Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79); see
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.05, at 86–88.
31. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251,
255 (1992). Today, Indian land holdings are estimated at 55.4 million acres, with approximately
44.4 million owned by tribes and eleven million held in the form of individual allotments. COHEN,
supra note 2, § 15.01, at 965, § 16.03[4][a], at 1048.
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“termination” of the federal-tribal relationship with certain Indian
tribes.32 Although the termination period quickly fell into disfavor, its
short tenure resulted in the end of the government-to-government
relationship between the United States and over seventy federally
recognized Indian tribes, and transferred jurisdiction over those tribes to
the states.33 This state control turned the historic federal-tribal
relationship on its head and states began aggressively to assert
jurisdiction over Indian country through laws such as P.L. 280.34 As
such, states began to view their claims of jurisdiction as the norm and
viewed the presence of tribal reservations as unwanted jurisdictional
enclaves that states opposed on principle, without examining the bona
fide interests of the tribes or the state itself.35
The presence of substantial numbers of non-Indians within Indian
country and their presence on non-tribal land increased the states’
desires to assert jurisdiction over their non-Indian citizens in Indian
territories. Recall, however, that it was Georgia’s assertion of
jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s presence on the Cherokee Reservation
that resulted in the categorical rule that states lacked jurisdiction within
Indian country.36 Changes in federal law were necessary for states to
accomplish their end. With Indian peoples no longer physically
separated from the non-Indian population, and their reservations now
included within the exterior boundaries of many states, local racism and
jurisdictional jealousy combined to increase efforts to reduce federal
protection of tribal autonomy. Nowhere is this more true than in the
context of criminal jurisdiction—the focus of P.L. 280. Before launching
into the P.L. 280 issues that are the focus of this Article, a review of
general criminal jurisdiction rules is necessary.

32. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to recommend
tribes for termination); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.06, at 95. In general, “[termination] would
mean that Indian tribes would eventually lose any special standing they had under Federal law: the
tax exempt status of their lands would be discontinued; Federal responsibility for their economic
and social well-being would be repudiated; and the tribes themselves would be effectively
dismantled.” Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), H.R.
Doc. 91-363, at 1. But see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (termination of
Menominee Indian Tribe did not abrogate tribal rights to hunt and fish free of state regulation).
33. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.06, at 95.
34. See infra Part III.
35. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 249
(2005).
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN
COUNTRY FROM EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL CONTROL TO AN
INCREASED STATE ROLE IS INCONSISTENT WITH SELFDETERMINATION AND CONSENT PRINCIPLES

Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country evolved from early
acknowledgement of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over persons within
aboriginal territories, to a gradual assertion of paramount federal
authority over crimes involving tribal members and non-Indians. The
federal government initially took a hands-off approach to intra-tribal
disputes, but as the United States shifted toward assimilation, it asserted
jurisdiction over major crimes between tribal members. Federal
domination of criminal jurisdiction increased over time and was
accompanied in 1968 by the reduction of tribal authority to impose
punishments on criminal offenders in tribal court proceedings.37 While
there are many problems with the assertion and implementation of
federal jurisdiction and policies, most evidence points to the conclusion
that the exercise of state jurisdiction in the criminal law arena has made
a bad situation worse.38 Before exploring these issues more deeply, it is
useful to set out the basic scheme governing criminal jurisdiction in
Indian country.
The term “Indian country” is the geographic touchstone for
application of the Indian law jurisdictional rules.39 The modern
definition was adopted in 1948 to take policy changes and various
Supreme Court decisions into account.40 Prior to 1948, the definitions of
Indian country were supplied by Congress,41 or the Supreme Court as a
matter of common law.42 In United States v. John,43 the Court explained
that while “earlier cases had suggested a more technical and limited

37. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709
(2006) (giving an insightful and descriptive critique of the adverse effects of federal policies in the
criminal justice area). Tribal sentencing authority was limited to six months in jail and a $500 fine
per offense, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 77 (1968), and now stands at one year in jail and
a $10,000 fine, with the option to increase the penalties to three years per offense with a $15,000
fine, provided certain conditions are met. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006).
38. DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND
PUBLIC LAW 280, at 200 (2012) [hereinafter CAPTURED JUSTICE].
39. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 182–99.
40. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)).
41. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161 § 1, 4 Stat. 729.
42. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 n.18 (1978) (citing Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204
(1877)); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 3.04[2][b], at 184–88.
43. 437 U.S. 634.
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definition of ‘Indian country,’” it was a “more expansive scope of the
term that was incorporated in the 1948 revision of Title 18.”44 The
current statute defines Indian Country as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities . . . and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way
running through the same.45
This statute’s most often applied section is that dealing with
“reservation” Indian country. Of particular importance here, the
reservation component expressly includes lands patented in fee simple to
non-Indians and state rights-of-way within reservations as Indian
country.46 The Supreme Court noted that the reason for the unified
treatment of all land within reservations was to facilitate effective law
enforcement by avoiding the need to determine land status on a tract-bytract basis to determine the bounds of federal criminal jurisdiction.47
A.

Federal Jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country Increased as
Indian Nations Succumbed to Federal Domination

Congress first treaded lightly when passing criminal laws affecting
Indians and their territory, but gradually increased federal power as the
non-Indian population grew. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790
made crimes by non-Indians against Indian victims federal offenses.48
Offenses by Indians against non-Indians were generally dealt with
through diplomatic channels in the early days of federal-tribal relations.
In 1817, Congress adopted the first version of the Indian Country
Crimes Act (ICCA), which made offenses by non-Indians and Indians in
Indian territory federal offenses.49 The ICCA extends federal criminal
laws that apply to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as military
bases and national parks, to Indian country.50 The ICCA has two
44. Id. at 649 n.18.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (emphasis added).
46. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)
(rejecting the State of Washington’s argument that the words “notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent” extends only to land patented to an Indian).
47. Id. at 358–59.
48. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 34, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
49. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, § 1, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)).
50. The geographic jurisdictional reach of the statute is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 7. The federal
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important exceptions. First, it does not cover Indian-on-Indian crimes.51
Second, if an Indian has first been punished for a crime under tribal law,
he or she may not be prosecuted under the ICCA for the same offense.52
The ICCA also incorporates state law crimes under the Assimilative
Crimes Act (ACA)53 to fill gaps in the federal criminal code.54 Thus, if a
crime committed in Indian country is not covered directly by the federal
criminal code for federal enclaves, a federal prosecutor may apply state
criminal law through the ICCA. The second source of modern criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country is the Major Crimes Act (MCA),55 which
defines sixteen crimes as federal offenses when committed by Indians
(whether the victims are Indian or not).56 The MCA was passed in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.57
There, the Court ruled that the federal government was barred from
prosecuting an Indian for the murder of another tribal member because
of the ICCA’s Indian-on-Indian exception.58 The incident had been dealt
crimes made applicable include most felonies and a wide variety of offenses related to the subject
matter of federal enclaves. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 2251
(sexual exploitation of children in federal territories).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Victimless crimes such as adultery also are not covered by the ICCA.
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605–06 (1916); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][c][iii], at
735–36 (citing and criticizing several lower court cases that have not followed Quiver).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. An exception for Indians who had been punished by the local law of their
tribe was added in 1854. Act of Mar. 27,1854, § 3, 10 Stat. 270.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 13.
54. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 719 (1946) (assuming that the ACA was
subsumed within the ICCA); COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][c][ii], at 734.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
56. The Major Crimes Act reads:
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person
any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or
neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Any offense
referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in
accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at
the time of such offense.
Id.
57. 109 U.S. 566 (1883); see SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 134–40
(1994); COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][e] at 742.
58. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. While the ICCA and the MCA provide the substantive
law for federal prosecutions in Indian country, at the sentencing stage the United States Sentencing
Guidelines serve as a guide to the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006); see COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 9.02[2][h], at 747–49. “The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 conditionally eliminated the death
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with under traditional Brule Sioux law, which called for a tribal council
meeting, family meetings with a peacemaker, and restitution in order to
restore order to the tribal community.59 The ethnocentric non-Indian
view was that such tribal justice systems were inadequate and western
notions of criminal punishment should be imposed on tribes, and thus
the MCA became law.
In addition, some courts have held that the United States has
jurisdiction over some general federal criminal laws within Indian
country.60 These appellate court rulings have been criticized because
Congress has not expressly made such offenses applicable to Indians in
Indian country. Just as the MCA was necessary to reach specifically
enumerated Indian-on-Indian offenses, it seems that general federal
statutes should not apply in Indian country unless Congress has
expressly stated its intention to do so. However, these federal appeals
courts appear in agreement that such general crimes have a nationwide
scope and therefore should reach into Indian country.
B.

Tribes Retain Inherent Jurisdiction over Indians

Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their own members and
other Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes.61 Tribal
sentencing authority, however, was severely limited by the Indian Civil
Rights Act (ICRA), which provides that tribes may impose only a
sentence of up to one year in jail and/or $5000 per offense.62 The Tribal
Law and Order Act of 2010 amended this to provide that subject to
certain federal standards, tribes may sentence an Indian defendant to up

penalty for Native American defendants prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act or the General
Crimes Act, subject to the penalty being reinstated by a tribe’s governing body.” United States v.
Gallaher, 608 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3598).
59. See HARRING, supra note 57, at 110, 119, 141.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 387 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(b), which bars retaliation against a federal witness, applies to crimes committed by and
against Indians in Indian country); United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, “is a federal criminal statute of
nationwide applicability, and therefore applies equally to everyone everywhere within the United
States, including Indians in Indian country”).
61. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (upholding congressional restoration of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331–32
(1978) (recognizing inherent tribal jurisdiction over tribal members).
62. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (tribes were originally
limited to imposing penalties of six months in jail and a $500 fine per offense) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006)). The 1986 amendments increased the penalties. Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§ 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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to three years in jail and impose a $5000 fine per offense.63
Although the Supreme Court has never decided the issue,64 tribes
retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indians with the federal
government for crimes governed by the MCA and ICCA.65 In United
States v. Wheeler,66 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Constitution did not bar federal prosecution for an offense after a
tribal prosecution based on the identical conduct.67 The Court noted that
“tribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting significant tribal
interests. Federal pre-emption of a tribe’s jurisdiction to punish its
members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially from
tribal self-government, just as federal pre-emption of state criminal
jurisdiction would trench upon important state interests.”68 Because
tribal powers may not be limited by implication, it seems apparent that
concurrent tribal jurisdiction over matters covered by federal criminal
statutes is not preempted.69
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,70 the Supreme Court ruled that
Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants
on the ground that such jurisdiction had been divested through the tribes’
incorporation into the United States, various other acts of Congress, and
the “shared assumptions” of the three branches of the federal
government.71 Despite the lack of jurisdiction, tribal police do have
“authority to stop and detain a non-Indian who allegedly violates state
and tribal law while traveling on a public road within a reservation until

63. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2279 (relevant
portions codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (a)(7), (b) (Supp. IV 2010)). Tribes are permitted to stack
sentences for separate offenses up to a total of nine years and $15,000 in fines. Id.
64. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990).
65. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. 435 U.S. 313.
67. Id.; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (tribal prosecution for murder not subject
to the dictates of the Bill of Rights on the ground that tribes are separate sovereigns and not arms of
the federal government).
68. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.
69. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 119–20.
70. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
71. Id. at 210–11. For a critical analysis of the historical record relied upon by the Court, see
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979). The Oliphant ruling was
extended by the Supreme Court to bar tribal jurisdiction not only over non-Indians, but also over
Indians who are members of other tribes. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1989). Congress reversed
the Court’s ruling when it amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to restore the inherent criminal
jurisdiction of all federally recognized tribes over “all Indians” in the governing tribe’s territory. 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
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that person can be turned over to state authorities for charging and
prosecution.”72 Washington State law provides for cross-deputization
agreements, permitting tribal law enforcement officials to enforce
applicable state law.73 Tribes may also cross-deputize state and federal
officers under tribal laws if they wish.
C.

States Have No Jurisdiction over Criminal Matters Involving
Indians

State jurisdiction over Indian country is precluded by the inherent
sovereignty of Indian nations,74 and is also preempted by the MCA and
the ICCA.75 Similarly, states lack jurisdiction over crimes by nonIndians when the victim is an Indian because of the same principles. On
the other hand, by common law rule, states have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians within Indian
country.76 States also appear to have jurisdiction over victimless crimes
committed by non-Indians when no federal or tribal interests are

72. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 376, 850 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1993); cf. Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n.11 (1997) (“We do not here question the authority of tribal police
to patrol roads within a reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to
detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating
state law.”); see also State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011)
(holding that the stop-and-detain rule does not extend to tribal police officers who stop and detain
non-Indians on state land outside of an Indian reservation, even when the stop is based on probable
cause occurring within reservation boundaries); Kevin Naud, Jr., Comment, Fleeing East from
Indian Country: State v. Erickson and Tribal Inherent Sovereign Authority to Continue CrossJurisdictional Fresh Pursuit, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1251, 1272–74 (2012) (discussing Eriksen III).
73. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010). The Washington State statute provides that:
Tribal police officers under subsection (2) of this section shall be recognized and authorized to
act as general authority Washington peace officers. A tribal police officer recognized and
authorized to act as a general authority Washington peace officer under this section has the
same powers as any other general authority Washington peace officer to enforce state laws in
Washington, including the power to make arrests for violations of state laws.
Id. § 10.92.020(1). The second section of the statute contains provisions related to training and
insurance requirements and concludes with a provision mandating arbitration if an affected county
and tribe cannot reach a cross-deputization agreement after a tribal request that conforms to the
statutory requirements. Id. § 10.92.020(2). Both tribal and state police may be certified to enforce
federal law within Indian country. 25 U.S.C. § 2804 (2006). State officers may be so authorized
only if the affected Indian tribe does not object. Id. § 2804(c).
74. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); cf. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883) (federal government had no jurisdiction to prosecute Indian for murder of another Indian
absent affirmative grant from Congress).
75. COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.03[1], at 754.
76. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240
(1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
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implicated.77
Congress has used its power under the Indian Commerce Clause to
authorize the exercise of state jurisdiction in haphazard fashion. Thus,
New York,78 Iowa,79 and Kansas80 all were authorized to exercise some
jurisdiction over Indian country in those states.81 These statutes were the
precursors to the most sweeping authorization of state jurisdiction ever:
Public Law 280, which was adopted in the midst of the federal
termination era. In addition, a number of modern land claims settlement
acts contain provisions that place criminal law enforcement authority
largely in the hands of state authorities, while sometimes preserving
concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction.82

77. COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.03[1], at 754–55. These are crimes that do not involve an Indian
victim, individual Indian defendant, or tribal property.
78. Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2006)) (grant of
criminal jurisdiction over all reservations in state, but subject to savings clause excepting state
authority over “hunting and fishing rights as guaranteed them by agreement, treaty, or custom,” and
preempting any state fish and game licensing requirements).
79. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (grant of criminal jurisdiction over Sac and Fox
Reservation; concurrent federal jurisdiction reserved).
80. Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006))
(grant of criminal jurisdiction over all reservations, including trust and restricted allotments in
Kansas; concurrent federal jurisdiction reserved); see Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 110
(1993) (construing the Kansas grant as including concurrent state jurisdiction over crimes covered
by the federal Major Crimes Act).
81. For a discussion of these statutes and authorities construing them, see COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 6.04, at 581–84.
82. See, e.g., Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-444, 108 Stat. 4632
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1776); Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1771) (state
granted jurisdiction with no mention of tribal or federal jurisdiction); Mashantucket Pequot Indian
Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60) (state
granted jurisdiction with no mention of tribal or federal jurisdiction); Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35) (state
granted jurisdiction subject to exception for internal matters), construed in Penobscot Nation v.
Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1999); Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No.
95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–16) (state granted jurisdiction).
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III. P.L. 280 AUTHORIZED STATE CRIMINAL AND SOME CIVIL
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY IN A MANNER
INCONSISTENT WITH MODERN SELF-DETERMINATION
POLICIES
A.

The Passage of P.L. 280 Marked a Retreat from the Policy of
Support for Tribal Institutions Under the IRA

After the encouragement and tangible support provided to Indian
tribes in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, Congress quickly lapsed
into a policy of assimilation and eventually into a policy of selectively
terminating the government-to-government relationship with Indian
tribes.83 In 1953 Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108,
which set a goal of removing federal jurisdiction over Indian country
and making Indians subject to general state law as quickly as possible.84
Congress implemented this policy by enacting statutes applicable to
individual tribes and set out plans for effecting the termination of the
federal-tribal relationship.85 Another prong of the termination policy
came through P.L. 280,86 which required six states to assert criminal
jurisdiction and some civil jurisdiction over the Indian country located
within those states.87 In addition, Congress provided a disclaimer of any
83. COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 1.05–.06, at 85–97; see also WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 1–89.
84. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953). Although this policy was eroded in the 1960s and was
repudiated by President Nixon in 1970, Congress did not formally revoke it until 1988. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2501(f) (“Congress repudiates and rejects House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83d Congress
and any policy of unilateral termination of Federal relations with any Indian nation.”). See generally
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 97–113.
85. The court in Ute Distribution Corp. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.1 (10th Cir.
1991), observed that:
These tribes included: the Southern Paiutes of Utah (Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat.
1099 (repealed 1980) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 741–760); the Alabama and Coushatta
Indians of Texas (Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 721–
728); sixty-one tribes and bands in western Oregon (Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 773, 68 Stat.
724 (repealed 1977 with respect to Siletz Tribe) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 691–
708); the Klamaths of Oregon (Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (repealed 1978 with
respect to Modoc Tribe) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564–564x); the Menominee
Tribe of Wisconsin (Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (formerly
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 891–902); and the mixed-blood Utes of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservations in Utah).
Id.
86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
87. Congress also provided that the Major Crimes Act and Indian Country Crimes Act would no
longer be applicable in the six mandatory states. 18 U.S.C. § 1162. In 2010, however, Congress
gave Indian tribes authority to request the application of those statutes by making a request to the
Attorney General. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221(b), 124 Stat. 2272
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(d) (Supp. I 2010)). Regulations implementing the statute can be found
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effect on any trust property, water rights, or hunting, trapping or fishing
rights, including tribal regulatory power over such activities.88
Finally, Congress also included a provision authorizing other states to
unilaterally assert criminal and/or civil jurisdiction over Indian
country.89 The fact that this provision did not include a role for affected
tribes in the process has long been viewed as morally and politically
unacceptable by Indian tribes.90 President Eisenhower expressed great
at 28 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2012). In the preamble to the Rule, the Justice Department stated that: “As
indicated above, the Department concludes that the United States has concurrent jurisdiction over
General Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act violations in areas where States have assumed criminal
jurisdiction under ‘optional’ Public Law 280.” 76 Fed. Reg. 76,037, 76,039 (Dec. 6, 2011). The
Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. High Elk, 902 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.
1990). But see United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute
incorporating voluntary assumption component of P.L. 280 preempted federal jurisdiction under
MCA). United States v. Johnson, No. CR80-57MV (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1980) (holding that the
Major Crimes Act did not apply to prosecution over which Washington State assumed jurisdiction).
The United States appealed, but withdrew its appeal before a decision on the merits. United States v.
Johnson, No. 80-1391 (July 23, 1980). For a critical examination of the issue, see COHEN, supra
note 2, § 6.04[3][d], at 567–68.
88. The criminal jurisdiction disclaimer provides in full:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation
thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006).
The civil jurisdiction counterpart provides:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any
interest therein.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006).
89. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (“The consent of the United
States is hereby given to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at
such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action,
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.”).
90. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 544–46 (1975); see DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., Background Report on Public Law 280, at 22 (94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter
Public Law 280] (describing opposition of the Colville and Yakima Tribes of Washington because
of “a ‘fear of inequitable treatment in the State courts and fear that extension of State law to their
reservations would result in the loss of various rights’”); see also Washington v. Confederated
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concern over the law’s failure to obtain tribal consent to the intrusion on
tribal jurisdiction in his signing statement.91 Although Congress
ultimately approved a provision in the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act that
required a state to obtain tribal consent before adopting P.L. 280,92 seven
states had already unilaterally asserted some measure of jurisdiction.93
B.

P.L. 280’s Grant of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction Did Not
Include Civil Regulatory Authority

The primary focus of P.L. 280 was to grant states criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country. The legislative history makes it clear that “the
foremost concern of Congress at the time of enacting PL-280 was
lawlessness on the reservations and the accompanying threat to Anglos
living nearby.”94 States did not gain any authority to regulate civil
activities in Indian country through P.L. 28095 because Congress did not
extend the full panoply of civil regulatory powers to the states, but only
intended to afford Indians a judicial forum to resolve disputes among
themselves and with non-Indians.96 This principle is clear from Bryan v.
Itasca County,97 in which the county attempted to tax non-trust property
within a reservation under the guise that P.L. 280 granted it authority to
do so. The Court rejected Itasca County’s argument that the grant of
civil jurisdiction included the authority to impose taxes and regulations
on non-trust property within Indian country.98
This interpretation of P.L. 280 was reinforced in the landmark case of
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.99 In Cabazon,
California sought to regulate bingo and various poker games on
reservations under P.L. 280’s criminal provisions. State law permitted
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 489 n.33 (1979) (noting Yakima
opposition to state jurisdiction since 1952).
91. CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 11 (citing CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING
TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1996)).
92. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Searching for an Exit: The Indian Civil Rights
Act and Public Law 280, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 247, 247 (Carpenter, Fletcher,
Riley eds., 2012) [hereinafter Searching for an Exit].
93. COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.03[a], at 544–45 n.308.
94. Public Law 280, supra note 90, at 541.
95. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
96. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388–91.
97. 426 U.S. 373. For a history of the litigation, see Kevin K. Washburn, How a $147 County Tax
Notice Helped Bring Tribes More Than $200 Billion in Indian Gaming Revenue: The Story of Bryan
v. Itasca County, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 421(Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011).
98. Id. at 390.
99. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).

04 - Anderson Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

NEGOTIATING JURISDICTION

12/7/2012 7:36 PM

933

bingo and other games, but only for charitable purposes and subject to
regulations with which the tribal gaming operators refused to comply.100
California sought to enforce these regulations by punishing these
violators with criminal penalties.101 When determining whether
California had jurisdiction to regulate gaming under the criminal
provisions of P.L. 280, the Court strongly reinforced its holding in
Bryan.102 The Court ruled that “it must be determined whether the law is
criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under § 2,
or civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant to private
civil litigation in state court.”103 California argued that because it
imposed criminal penalties for violations of its regulations, the case
should not be analyzed under Bryan’s (or P.L. 280’s) civil jurisdiction
rules. The Court rejected California’s plea by drawing a distinction
between state “criminal/prohibitory” laws and state “civil/regulatory”
laws.104 Conduct that is actually prohibited as a matter of state law and
policy falls on the criminal side of P.L. 280’s grant, while activity that is
generally permitted but regulated through state laws and rules is not
within P.L. 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction.105 The Court rejected
California’s argument that because criminal penalties attached to the
violation of the state regulations, it should be regarded as prohibited
criminal conduct and thus subject to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280.
After examining the state’s gaming laws, the majority concluded that “in
light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling
activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its
state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than
prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.”106 The Court thus
eliminated the argument that a state could simply attach criminal
penalties to a regulatory program to enforce the regulations pursuant to
P.L. 280.
The Court’s test is easy to apply in most cases.107 For example, there
is no doubt that serious crimes such as murder, assault, robbery and the
like all fall on the criminal/prohibitory side of the line. In some cases,
states have explicitly classified certain offenses as civil infractions rather
100. Id. at 205–06.
101. Id.
102. See generally id.
103. Id. at 208.
104. Id. at 209.
105. Id. at 209–10 (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 211.
107. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 546–53.
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than criminal offenses. This distinction was critical in an action brought
by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation where the Ninth
Circuit considered Washington’s assertion of civil and criminal
jurisdiction over activities on highways within Indian country.108 The
court ruled that because the state legislature decriminalized the traffic
code, those civil regulations could not be enforced through P.L. 280.109
Because state regulatory authority is not sanctioned by P.L. 280, what
is left is the application of state rules of decision in civil litigation.110
While state taxation, zoning, and workers’ compensation laws are
regulatory in nature and thus easily identified as outside of P.L. 280’s
grant of civil jurisdiction,111 other laws have proved difficult to classify.
For example, a dependency proceeding leading to the involuntary
termination of parental rights was characterized by the Ninth Circuit as a
non-regulatory procedure akin to the adjudication of a private civil
dispute over a contract or tort claim, thus falling within P.L. 280’s
ambit.112 But the Wisconsin Attorney General reached the opposite
conclusion in an opinion years earlier.113 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling
rested on the notion that a dependency proceeding is a dispute about the
status of a private individual—a child—and that “child dependency
proceedings are more analogous to the ‘private legal disputes’ that fall
under a state’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction than to the regulatory
regimes at issue in Bryan and Cabazon.”114 This reasoning ignores the
extreme coercive consequence of a dependency adjudication, namely
removal of a child from the custody of a parent, and the possible

108. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991).
109. Id. at 148; see also COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 549 n.346.
110. State law is “applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court.”
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208. Rules of decision can be the common law rules utilized in private tort or
contract litigation, or the statutes that provide substantive law for the resolution of such disputes.
111. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 548; cf. Gobin v. Snohomish Cnty., 304 F.3d 909
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that county lacked zoning authority over Indian fee land within Indian
country).
112. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2005). In Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash.
2d 192, 525 P.2d 217 (1974), the court upheld state jurisdiction over child dependency matters
under the 1963 statute, but it is important to note that the case was decided prior to the criminalprohibitory/civil-regulatory dichotomy in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
113. 70 Op. Att’y Gen. Wis. 237, 241, 246–48 (1981). But see In re Commitment of Burgess, 665
N.W.2d 124, 132 (Wis. 2003) (involuntary commitment of an individual, who is found to be a
“sexually violent person” under chapter 980, is “civil” rather than “criminal” based on the purposes
of the chapter to provide treatment and to protect the public). See Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676
(7th Cir. 2006) (declining to issue habeas corpus petition despite doubts that involuntary
commitment scheme was within P.L. 280’s jurisdictional grant).
114. Mann, 415 F.3d at 1059.
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termination of parental rights. Such an outcome is only possible because
of the state’s authority to regulate domestic relations matters as a party
to an adjudication, which is far different from a state court being
available to adjudicate private civil matters such as voluntary adoptions,
contract disputes, or tort claims arising out of on-reservation conduct.
In addition, there are a number of jurisdictional matters unaffected by
P.L. 280. First, P.L. 280 disclaims any grant of state authority to regulate
or tax trust or restricted property, or to affect any treaty-protected rights
including water, hunting, and fishing rights.115 The civil disclaimer also
precludes state probate jurisdiction over trust property and any interest
therein.116 Second, P.L. 280 does not affect the relative bounds of state
regulatory jurisdiction under the preemption and infringement tests
described by the Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker.117 Under these related doctrines, federal law often preempts
state regulatory jurisdiction over non-members in Indian country.
Moreover, state regulatory jurisdiction over tribal members is generally
preempted.118 Third, issues of tribal authority over non-members on nonIndian fee land are analyzed under the Montana line of cases, which
establish a presumption that there is no tribal jurisdiction absent federal
delegation, or exceptional circumstances.119 Because P.L. 280’s
jurisdictional grant does not affect these issues, they are similarly not in
play when a state retrocedes any or all jurisdiction it gained under P.L.
280.
Also unaffected by retrocession are crimes related to Indian gaming,
which is governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(IGRA).120 Three provisions of the IGRA govern gaming-related
criminal activity in Indian country.121 One provision makes state
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006) (civil); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006) (criminal). The full text of
both disclaimers is quoted in note 88, supra.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b).
117. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1980) (evaluating
preemption of state jurisdiction over non-Indian conducting business with Indian tribe by balancing
the relative federal, tribal, and state interests in light of traditional notions of tribal independence
from states).
118. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (state taxation of Indians in
Indian country generally preempted); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 520–37. Of course, as
noted above, P.L. 280 alters these doctrines to the extent it opens the courthouse door to adjudicate
civil causes of action in state courts and to apply state law to resolve such disputes.
119. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 6.02[2], at 515–20.
120. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006). See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 12, at 857–88.
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–68.
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gambling laws applicable within Indian country as a matter of federal
law,122 but “gambling” does not include class I or II gaming as defined
in IGRA, or class III gaming if conducted pursuant to a tribal-state
compact.123 However, IGRA explicitly confers authority to prosecute
any violations of state law exclusively on the federal government, unless
otherwise provided by a tribal-state compact.124 This provision has been
interpreted as preempting any state criminal jurisdiction over gamingrelated matters. In Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache,125 the
court rejected California’s argument that it retained jurisdiction to
enforce state gaming laws in Indian country.126
To summarize, in non-mandatory P.L. 280 states: (1) Indians are
potentially subject to prosecution by federal authorities under the Major
Crimes Act or Indian Country Crimes Act, by state authorities under the
terms of a P.L. 280 assumption, and by tribal authorities under inherent
tribal power; (2) non-Indians are subject to federal prosecution under the
Indian Country Crimes Act, and state prosecution under the terms of a
P.L. 280 assumption, or the common law rules permitting state
prosecutions of non-Indian versus non-Indian crime. When considering
state criminal jurisdiction under P.L. 280, one must remember to
evaluate whether the particular law is simply a civil regulation dressed
up with criminal penalties—and thus not enforceable under the
criminal/prohibitory civil/regulatory dichotomy developed by the
Supreme Court. If this were not difficult enough, the Supreme Court has
permitted non-mandatory states to selectively assert jurisdiction under
P.L. 280, which adds another level of complexity in those
jurisdictions—such as Washington.

122. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (“Subject to subsection (c), for purposes of Federal law, all State laws
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to
criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the
same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.”).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(c). Definitions of gaming classes can be found at 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)–(8)
(2006). Class III gaming is commonly known as casino-style gaming and is the most lucrative and
prevalent form of gaming nationally and in Washington.
124. “The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations
of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian country, [unless a
tribal-state compact provides otherwise].” 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006). The compacting process
related to the allocation of state and tribal jurisdiction is governed by 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)
(2006).
125. 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994).
126. Id. at 539–40.
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IV. WASHINGTON’S JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME UNDER P.L.
280 IS CONFUSING AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE
CONSENT PARADIGM
The rules governing federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction set out in
Section II changed when the Washington State Legislature passed
important legislation in 1957127 and 1963.128 The 1957 legislation
followed the consent paradigm as it offered state jurisdiction over Indian
country only upon request from the affected tribe. On the other hand, in
1963, the state selectively assumed jurisdiction without regard to tribal
wishes.129 Eleven tribes requested state jurisdiction pursuant to the 1957
statute, although seven tribes achieved partial retrocession of state
jurisdiction.130
Challenges to state jurisdiction came promptly. Individuals subject to
state prosecutions contested the validity of the state’s assertion of
jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. In State v. Paul,131 the defendant
127. 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 941, ch. 240. The operative section of that statute is carried forward
at WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (2010):
Whenever the governor of this state shall receive from the majority of any tribe or the tribal
council or other governing body, duly recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of any
Indian tribe, community, band, or group in this state a resolution expressing its desire that its
people and lands be subject to the criminal or civil jurisdiction of the state of Washington to
the full extent authorized by federal law, he or she shall issue within sixty days a proclamation
to the effect that such jurisdiction shall apply to all Indians and all Indian territory,
reservations, country, and lands of the Indian body involved to the same extent that this state
exercises civil and criminal jurisdiction or both elsewhere within the state: PROVIDED, That
jurisdiction assumed pursuant to this section shall nevertheless be subject to the limitations set
forth in RCW 37.12.060.
Id.
128. 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 346, ch. 36 (codified at WASH REV. CODE § 37.12.010); see also M.
Brent Leonhard, Returning Washington P.L. 280 Jurisdiction to Its Original Consent-Based
Grounds, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 663, 704–12 (2012) (discussing the 1957 and 1963 statutes).
129. See infra notes 137–68 and accompanying text for details about the 1963 statute.
130. The eleven are: Muckleshoot, Squaxin Island, Nisqually, Skokomish, Suquamish (Port
Madison), Tulalip Tribes, Quinault Indian Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation,
Quileute Indian Reservation, Swinomish Tribal Community, and Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation. 1 NAT’L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS’N, JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN: THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW 280 UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON
INDIAN RESERVATIONS 78–81 (1974). The Swinomish and Colville requests for state jurisdiction
were made after 1963, and thus under that statute, which carried forward most of the voluntary
consent provisions of the 1957 statute. See Colville Business Council Res. 1965-4 (Jan. 13, 1965)
(full jurisdiction, except fish and game regulation) (on file with Washington Law Review);
Swinomish Indian S. Res. (Mar. 23, 1963) (criminal jurisdiction only) (on file with Washington
Law Review). The 1963 version dropped the requirement for the Yakima, Colville, and Spokane
tribes that any assumption be approved by a two-thirds vote at a tribal referendum. Cf. 1963 Wash.
Sess. Laws 346, ch. 36; 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 941, ch. 240. See infra note 178 for the seven tribes
that achieved partial state jurisdiction.
131. 53 Wash. 2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959).
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challenged a prosecution under the 1957 statute on the ground that the
state’s enabling act and constitution disclaimed any jurisdiction over
Indian lands.132 While Congress authorized states to amend their
constitutions so that they could accept jurisdiction over Indian country
under P.L. 280,133 Washington failed to do so. Nevertheless, the
Washington State Supreme Court upheld Washington’s assertion of
jurisdiction, reasoning that the state constitution need not be amended as
a matter of P.L. 280 or state law.134 In addition to the Paul litigation, the
Quinault Indian Nation unsuccessfully challenged Washington’s
assertion of jurisdiction in federal court before the Ninth Circuit on the
same state constitutional ground.135 After a later Ninth Circuit ruling that
Washington’s partial assumption of jurisdiction scheme lacked a rational
basis and thus violated the federal equal protection guarantee, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, and also held that states with disclaimers
in their constitutions were not required as a matter of federal law to
amend them to assume P.L. 280 jurisdiction.136
132. The state’s enabling act provided:
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever disclaim
all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to
all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the
title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States . . . .
Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (emphasis added). It was mirrored in the state constitution.
WASH. CONST. art. 26.
133. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of any
Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the
people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the
case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.”).
134. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d at 794, 337 P.2d at 37.
135. Quinault Indian Nation v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 657–58 (9th Cir. 1966). The Quinault
case is interesting for the fact that a group purporting to be the tribal council requested full state
jurisdiction in 1958, and the state promptly assumed jurisdiction. Almost immediately, a petition
signed by sixty-eight members repudiated the original request. Id. at 652. The Washington State
Supreme Court later upheld the assumption per the original request. State v. Bertrand, 61 Wash. 2d
333, 341, 378 P.2d 427, 432 (1963). Other cases challenging Washington’s mode of assumption are
Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wash. 2d 485, 457 P.2d 590 (1969), Tonasket v. State, 84 Wash. 2d
164, 525 P.2d 744 (1974), and Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 525 P.2d 217, 221
(1974). As early as 1972 there was a statewide tribal effort in Washington to obtain the retrocession
of state jurisdiction under P.L. 280. See State Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control Over Reservations,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 1972, at A5 [hereinafter Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control]; Leaders of
30 State Tribes Agree on Goals for Indians, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 16, 1972, at A11. For a detailed
discussion of tribal objections to P.L. 280, see Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 247–49, 263–
64.
136. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 493,
500–02 (1979), rev’g 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1977). The panel decision was prompted by an earlier
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The 1963 legislation unilaterally asserted civil and criminal
jurisdiction over (1) all off-reservation Indian country; (2) all
reservations, not including Indians on tribal or allotted lands within “an
established reservation”; and (3) Indians on tribal or allotted lands within
“an established reservation” in the following eight subject matter
areas:137
(1) Compulsory school attendance;
(2) Public assistance;
(3) Domestic relations;
(4) Mental illness;
(5) Juvenile delinquency;
(6) Adoption proceedings;
(7) Dependent children; and
(8) Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys,
roads and highways.138
A threshold issue in each case involving state jurisdiction over an
Indian is whether the alleged activity occurred on “tribal or allotted
lands” within a “reservation” and thus is beyond the scope of state
jurisdiction if not within one of the eight enumerated areas. For example,
in State v. Boyd,139 the court determined that land owned by the United
States Bureau of Reclamation within the Colville Reservation was not
“tribal or allotted land” so that state criminal jurisdiction was
permitted.140 In State v. Pink,141 the state lacked jurisdiction over a
firearms offense on a state highway right-of-way because the court
found that the underlying land was held in trust by the United States for
the benefit of the tribe, therefore the state’s jurisdiction was limited to

en banc remand to determine the equal protection issue. 550 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
137. This is a paraphrase of WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010). The verbatim text provides:
The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds itself to assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this state
in accordance with the consent of the United States given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public
Law 280, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to
Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and
held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States, unless the provisions of RCW 37.12.021 have been invoked, except for the
following [eight areas] . . . .
Id. For the enumerated eight areas, see infra text accompanying note 138.
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010. As set out in supra note 136, the Supreme Court upheld this
scheme in the face of an equal protection challenge.
139. 109 Wash. App. 244, 34 P.3d 912 (2001).
140. Id. at 252, 34 P.3d at 916.
141. 144 Wash. App. 945, 185 P.3d 634 (2008).
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traffic offenses.142 The court ruled in State v. Jim143 that a treaty fishing
access site was a “reservation” precluding state criminal or civil
jurisdiction over Indians, except for the eight areas.144 In State v.
Comenout,145 the court upheld criminal jurisdiction over tribal members
violating state law on an off-reservation allotment.146
Tribes formally recognized after P.L. 280 was amended in 1968 to
require tribal consent to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 are not subject
to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280.147 In State v. Squally,148 the court
faced the question of whether land added to the Nisqually reservation
after 1968 was subject to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280. The court
emphasized the Nisqually tribe’s original, broad request for full state
jurisdiction of its reservation under the 1957 statute and ruled that trust
land added to the reservation after 1968 was subject to state
jurisdiction.149 It is significant that in one instance where Congress chose
142. Id. at 955, 185 P.3d at 639. The court rejected state jurisdiction because “the State has not
shown that the Quinault Tribe relinquished its interest in the land.” Id. The state was not attempting
a prosecution for a traffic offense, but for unlawful possession of a firearm—a crime that did not
involve “operation of motor vehicles upon . . . [public] highways.” Id. at 956, 185 P.3d at 639. The
court distinguished Somday v. Rhay, 67 Wash. 2d 180, 184, 406 P.2d 931, 934 (1965), which upheld
full state jurisdiction over a highway right-of-way running across fee simple non-Indian land. The
court reasoned that because the tribe had surrendered its entire interest in the surface and
subsurface, the state could rely on its blanket assertion of jurisdiction over Indians on non-Indian
fee lands.
143. 173 Wash. 2d 672, 273 P.3d 434 (2012).
144. Id. at 685, 273 P.3d at 440; see also State v. Sohappy, 110 Wash. 2d 907, 757 P.2d 509
(1988) (holding that state did not have jurisdiction over an “in-lieu” fishing site that was created
under federal law to replace Indian fishing grounds developed by construction of the Bonneville
Dam). These cases could both have been decided on the alternative ground that P.L. 280’s
disclaimer of jurisdiction over treaty fishing rights precluded state jurisdiction. That is, assuming
P.L. 280 applied in full, it does not authorize jurisdiction over Indian treaty fishing rights. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162(b) (2006). Another ground for denying state jurisdiction is based on the fact that the
reservation Indian country was established after 1968 when tribal consent was made a prerequisite
to state assumptions of jurisdiction. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Moreover, state fish
and game laws are part of a civil/regulatory regime and thus beyond P.L. 280’s grant. COHEN, supra
note 2, § 18.03[2][b], at 1126–27. Any state jurisdiction over treaty hunting, fishing, or gathering
activity by Indians, whether on or off-reservation, must conform to the “conservation necessity
standards” set out by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id., § 18.04[3][b], at 1143–46; Washington v. Wash.
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 682 (1979).
145. 173 Wash. 2d 235, 267 P.3d 355 (2011).
146. Id. at 239, 267 P.3d at 357.
147. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 402, 406, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a), 1326
(2006)); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][f][ii], at 577–78.
148. 132 Wash. 2d 333, 343, 937 P.2d 1069, 1074 (1997).
149. Similarly, in State v. Cooper, 130 Wash. 2d 770, 928 P.2d 406 (1996), the court ruled that
state jurisdiction extended to off-reservation allotments that were in existence when the nonconsensual 1963 law passed. The court stated: “We assume, without deciding, that the subsequent
establishment of a new Indian reservation vitiates the pre-existing RCW 37.12.010 assumption of
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to make P.L. 280 applicable to lands taken in trust in a P.L. 280 state
after 1968 for a restored tribe it explicitly so provided.150 If the
preexisting assertion of state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 extended to
newly recognized tribes and Indian country, Congress’s action would
have been unnecessary. Moreover, the Indian law canons of construction
counsel against broadly interpreting P.L. 280 to the detriment of tribal
sovereignty as “statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian
tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being
resolved in favor of the Indians.”151
If a prosecution under P.L. 280 arises anywhere within Indian
country, the court must undertake an analysis of the criminal/prohibitory
civil/regulatory dichotomy.152 As a threshold matter, recall that state
civil jurisdiction under P.L. 280 is limited to “opening the courthouse
door” and does not authorize the exercise of state regulatory
jurisdiction.153 Thus, whenever the state asserts criminal jurisdiction
over an Indian, the prosecution must demonstrate that the conduct is
prohibited as a matter of state law and is not actually part of a civil
regulatory regime.
A significant amount of litigation has involved activity on public
highways under the eighth category— operation of vehicles on public
highways.154 In State v. Abrahamson,155 Division I of the Washington
State Court of Appeals correctly upheld a drunk driving conviction on

state jurisdiction with respect to Indian lands within the boundaries of the new reservation.” Id. at
781 n.6, 928 P.2d at 411 n.6 (emphasis in original). The court elaborated: “Four reservations were
formed after 1968, and their membership never elected to come under state jurisdiction. The
Jamestown-Klallam, Nooksack, Sauk Suiattle and Upper Skagit reservations are not subject to
RCW 37.12.010.” Id. (citing Pamela B. Loginsky, Criminal Jurisdiction Issues, in WASH. STATE
BAR ASS’N, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COMM. & INDIAN LAW SECTION, PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN
LAW, at 4–8 (1992)). The list should also include the Stillaguamish, Cowlitz, and Snoqualmie
Tribes, who were formally acknowledged after 1968, and whose reservations were similarly
established after 1968. The Cowlitz Tribe does not yet have a reservation.
150. 25 U.S.C. § 715d (authorizing state jurisdiction over Coquille Tribe in Oregon—a
mandatory P.L. 280 state).
151. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); see COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 6.04[3][f][ii], at 577–78; Leonhard, supra note 128, at 712–14.
152. See supra Part III.B. This would include the state’s assertion of jurisdiction over offreservation trust lands and allotments as well as fee lands within reservations. See COHEN, supra
note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 546–53 for a detailed discussion of the scope of jurisdiction granted by P.L.
280.
153. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991);
see CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17–18 (discussing Washington jurisdictional scheme).
154. See cases cited supra note 141 and infra notes 155, 157, 160, 162.
155. 157 Wash. App. 672, 238 P.3d 533 (2010).
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public roads on the Tulalip Indian Reservation.156 Drunk driving seems
clearly to fall on the criminal/prohibitory side of the P.L. 280 dichotomy.
On the other hand, in the case of an individual who did not consent to a
breathalyzer or blood draw test and was accordingly subject to a civil
suspension of his license, another court held that “[s]tatutes that
authorize evidence collection in support of prosecuting criminal cases
are properly classified as criminal in nature.”157 While the court may be
correct as to the authority to gather evidence from a defendant in support
of a prosecution over which P.L. 280 grants jurisdiction, the court’s
reasoning as to the criminality of the implied consent statute is doubtful.
This is because the only sanction for refusing a blood or breathalyzer test
is a civil license suspension, and the legislature explicitly provided that
refusal to comply with the implied consent statute “is designated as a
traffic infraction and may not be classified as a criminal offense.”158 The
court also inferred that the criminal/prohibitory civil/regulatory
distinction mandated by the United States Supreme Court might not
apply because Washington assumed jurisdiction in a more limited way
than the mandatory states involved in Cabazon and Bryan.159 This seems
incorrect and inconsistent with Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation v. Washington,160 where the tribes successfully challenged
the state’s authority over traffic offenses under P.L. 280. In Colville, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that Washington may not regulate speeding by tribal
members because speeding is not a criminal offense, but rather a civil
infraction sanctioned by a fine; the court drew no distinction based on
whether a state is one of the six mandatory jurisdictions under P.L.
280.161 However, in Yallup it was likely proper to use the result of the
156. Id. at 685, 238 P.3d at 539.
157. State v. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. 500, 508, 248 P.3d 1095, 1099 (2011).
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.020 (2010). The legislature made a long list of exceptions to the
rule, but did not include § 46.20.308(2)(a), which is the implied consent suspension statute. See id.
At the same time, the court cited Abrahamson, 157 Wash. App. 672, 238 P.3d 533, which held that
the state did have jurisdiction over the underlying drunk driving offense. Id.
159. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. at 506, 248 P.3d at 1098.
160. 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991).
161. Id. at 147–48. It is important to remember that P.L. 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction only
opened the courthouse door to private civil disputes. Thus, state courts may entertain personal injury
lawsuits involving Indians arising within reservations on public highways. McCrea v. Denison, 76
Wash. App. 95, 885 P.2d 856 (1994). Moreover, under Washington Superior Court Rule 82.5(b),
state courts may defer to tribal court jurisdiction. WASH. SUP. CT. R. 82.5(b). That rule, adopted in
1995, provides:
Where an action is brought in the superior court of any county of this state, and where, under
the Laws of the United States, concurrent jurisdiction over the matter in controversy has been
granted or reserved to an Indian tribal court of a federally recognized Indian tribe, the superior
court may, if the interests of justice require, cause such action to be transferred to the
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blood test in aid of the conviction for driving under the influence
because the state has jurisdiction over Indians on public highways and
the blood draw took place on fee land where the state has full P.L. 280
jurisdiction.162 The defendant was properly subject to criminal
prosecution for driving under the influence, but a civil sanction for
refusing a test under the implied consent statute would be of doubtful
validity.
There has been much less litigation involving the other seven
categories encompassed by the statute. The state asserted jurisdiction
over public assistance under category (2), although no reported decisions
have been located. Three of the categories—domestic relations (category
3),163 adoption proceedings (category 6), and dependent children
(category 7)—relate to family law matters and allow state courts to
adjudicate matters involving family relationships.164 It is more difficult
to determine the jurisdiction permissible in terms of commitments for
mental illness (category 4). Under the reasoning of Doe v. Mann, such
status determinations presumably would be within state civil

appropriate Indian tribal court. In making such determination, the superior court shall consider,
among other things, the nature of the action, the interests and identities of the parties, the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, whether state or tribal law will apply to the matter in
controversy, and the remedy available in such Indian tribal court.
Id.
162. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. at 503, 248 P.3d at 1097. When a state officer wishes to conduct a
search in territory where the state lacks jurisdiction under P.L. 280, the proper recourse is to obtain
a warrant from the tribal court. Cf. South Dakota v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004).
163. In Estate of Cross, 126 Wash. 2d 43, 50, 891 P.2d 26, 29 (1995), the Washington State
Supreme Court responded to a certified question from the United States Tax Court ruling that
“[c]ommunity property law is included under domestic relations [for purposes of P.L. 280
jurisdiction].” Interestingly, the court noted that “the United States Tax Court must make a factual
inquiry as to whether any tribal custom existed and if so whether the customs contradict or
supplement Washington community property law.” Id. at 49–50, 891 P.2d at 29. The court did not
consider other objections based on federal law. Id. at 49, 891 P.2d at 28–29. Of course, P.L. 280
expressly denies the application of state law or state jurisdiction to distribution of trust or restricted
property in probate proceedings or otherwise. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2006).
164. Prior to assumption of jurisdiction, it was clear that juvenile courts lacked jurisdiction to
enter dependency and delinquency determinations involving Indian children within Indian country.
See State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960). Adams was a
companion case to In re Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d 196, 356 P.2d 994 (1960). After the 1963
assumption of jurisdiction, the court in Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 525 P.2d 217,
222 (1974), upheld state jurisdiction over child dependency matters. The case was decided before
the U.S. Supreme Court developed the civil/regulatory limitation on state jurisdiction in Bryan v.
Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). If viewed as a civil regulatory proceeding due to the coercive
effect on parental rights, jurisdiction over such matters may no longer be with the state. See supra
notes 112 and 114 and the accompanying discussion of Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir.
2005). In any event, the exercise of any state jurisdiction in child custody proceedings must take
place in conformity with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2006).
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adjudicatory jurisdiction,165 although the coercive effect of a civil
commitment may make it fall on the civil/regulatory divide of P.L. 280
and thus beyond state jurisdiction. Adjudication of matters involving
juvenile delinquency (category 5) includes criminal matters on tribal and
allotted lands.166 On the other hand, with regard to compulsory school
attendance (category 1), one might expect state authority on trust and
allotted lands within reservations to be limited, or non-existent, because
regulation of school attendance seems to be a civil regulatory matter.
This is especially true because there is a federal statute that expressly
authorizes state jurisdiction over such on-reservation matters, but only
when the tribe has consented to state jurisdiction, and the Secretary of
the Interior has approved the state jurisdiction.167 That the state’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the eight areas took place years before
the civil regulatory/adjudicatory dichotomy was revealed by the
Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca County and amplified in Cabazon
Band 168 would explain how the legislature misconceived its authority on
the civil/regulatory side.
Now, anyone has to admit that this is a very complex and confusing
jurisdictional scheme. Nevertheless, state and tribal officials, courts, and
the public must deal with the piecemeal fashion in which state
jurisdiction has been imposed. One way to deal with it would be to
simply get rid of all P.L. 280 jurisdiction—something made possible by
Congress.

165. See supra notes 112 and 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of Doe v. Mann, 415
F.3d 1038.
166. Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction under Washington law over matters “[r]elating to
juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic or civil infractions, or violations as
provided in RCW 13.40.020 through 13.40.230[.]” WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e) (2010). To
the extent that a juvenile has committed a traffic or civil infraction, state court jurisdiction would
not exist because the state’s authority is limited to criminal jurisdiction and does not include civil
regulatory authority. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th
Cir. 1991).
167. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (2006). The implementing regulations at 25 C.F.R. § 273.52 (2012) refer to
P.L. 280 as if it conferred similar authority, but the regulation was adopted in 1975 and thus
predates the decision in Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, which made it clear that civil
regulatory jurisdiction was not granted by P.L. 280. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[5][a], at 586;
cf. Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d at 198–99, 356 P.2d at 996 (holding that state jurisdiction over truancy
matters under 25 U.S.C. § 231 would not extend to dependency proceeding).
168. See CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17–18 (discussing Washington’s jurisdictional
scheme).
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CONGRESS AMENDED P.L. 280 SO STATES MAY
RETROCEDE JURISDICTION, BUT TRIBES HAVE NO
FORMAL ROLE IN THE PROCESS

When P.L. 280 was passed, tribal dissatisfaction with the unilateral
assertion of state jurisdiction was widespread and well documented.169
Adopted in the midst of the now-repudiated termination era, the statute
and the state jurisdiction that accompanied it—most often without tribal
consent—are illustrative of discredited policies inconsistent with the
modern Indian self-determination policies. Washington tribes reacted to
this by initiating concerted efforts in 1972 to remove state jurisdiction
from their Indian country.170 When a local congressman claimed before a
congressional committee that jurisdictional confusion had been solved in
Washington under P.L. 280, the Vice-President of the National Congress
of American Indians, Mel Tonasket, retorted, “[Congressman] Meeds
made some statements that are totally false . . . . He should know
better.”171
Like Washington tribes, national Indian organizations were consistent
in their opposition to the unilateral imposition of P.L. 280 jurisdiction on
tribes.172 In one of many cases challenging the state’s assertion of P.L.
280 jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit observed that, “Indian tribes were
critical of Pub. L. 280 because section 7 authorized the application of
state law to tribes without their consent and regardless of their needs or
circumstances.”173 In 1968, Congress repealed the section of P.L. 280
that allowed states to acquire jurisdiction without tribal consent. It also
amended the statute by providing that “[t]he United States is authorized
to accept a retrocession by any State of all or any measure of the
criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, acquired by such State pursuant to
[P.L. 280].”174 The President of the United States authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to accept a state’s retrocession after consulting
with the Attorney General.175 However, the Secretary is not required to
169. See Leonhard, supra note 128, at 698–701.
170. See Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control, supra note 135.
171. David Suffia, Indian Leader Says Meeds Lied About Effects of Policing, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 31, 1978, at G7. Mr. Tonasket was also the Chairman of the Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation. Id.
172. 1 AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 205–06 (1977)
(discussing events leading to a draft retrocession bill introduced in 1975 by Senator Henry Jackson).
173. United States v. Lawrence, 595 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1979).
174. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1323 (2006)).
175. Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968).
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accept the retrocession. As a practical matter, the Secretary considers the
law enforcement capacity of the tribe and the United States with respect
to any retrocession in order to avoid a decrease in on-the-ground law
enforcement. Also, the views of the Justice Department carry great
weight because the local U.S. Attorney and FBI would have increased
obligations to enforce federal criminal laws in Indian country after any
retrocession. Since 1968, there have been thirty-one tribes that have fully
or partially achieved state retrocession over some or all of the Indian
country under their jurisdiction.176 Prior to 2012, Washington’s
retrocession laws provided that certain tribes that agreed to full state
criminal and civil jurisdiction under the 1957 state law could request
retrocession of some (but not all) state criminal jurisdiction.177 There
was no provision for retrocession of civil jurisdiction. Of the eleven
tribes that requested full state jurisdiction under the 1957 state law,
seven requested and were granted retrocession.178

176. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 265–66; CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 166.
There are 170 tribes in the lower forty-eight states that are subject to state authority under P.L. 280.
CAROLE GOLDBERG & DUANE CHAMPAGNE, NATIVE NATION LAW & POLICY CTR., FINAL REPORT:
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280, at 9–11 (2007) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT], available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/
centers%20and%20programs/native%20nations/pl280%20study.pdf.
The
Federal
Register
announcements accepting retrocession are as follows:
(1) full civil and criminal jurisdiction: fifteen Nevada tribes, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,501 (June 30,
1975); Ely Indian Colony, 53 Fed. Reg. 5837 (Feb. 26, 1988); Menominee, 41 Fed. Reg. 8516
(Feb. 27, 1976); Burns Paiute, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,169 (May 4, 1979); Omaha, 35 Fed. Reg.
16,598 (Oct. 16, 1970); Santee Sioux, 71 Fed. Reg. 7994 (Feb. 15, 2006);
(2) criminal retrocession only: Umatilla, 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (Jan. 8, 1981), Winnebago, 51 Fed.
Reg. 24,234 (July 2, 1986); Bois Forte Band of Chippewa, 40 Fed. Reg. 4026 (Jan. 27, 1975);
and
(3) partial criminal retrocession: Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 60 Fed. Reg.
33,318 (June 27, 1995); seven Washington tribes listed in infra note 178.
177. The current statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.120 (2010), provides:
Whenever the governor receives from the confederated tribes of the Colville reservation or the
Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish, Skokomish, Muckleshoot, or Tulalip tribe a resolution
expressing their desire for the retrocession by the state of all or any measure of the criminal
jurisdiction acquired by the state pursuant to RCW 37.12.021 over lands of that tribe’s
reservation, the governor may, within ninety days, issue a proclamation retroceding to the
United States the criminal jurisdiction previously acquired by the state over such reservation.
However, the state of Washington shall retain jurisdiction as provided in RCW 37.12.010. The
proclamation of retrocession shall not become effective until it is accepted by an officer of the
United States government in accordance with 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1323 (82 Stat. 78, 79) and in
accordance with procedures established by the United States for acceptance of such
retrocession of jurisdiction. The Colville tribes and the Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish,
Skokomish, Muckleshoot, and Tulalip tribes shall not exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
Id.
178. The Muckleshoot, Squaxin Island, Skokomish, and Nisqually Indian tribes remain subject to
full state jurisdiction. The seven tribes who achieved limited retrocession are: Tulalip Tribes, 65
Fed. Reg. 75,948 (Dec. 5, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 77,905 (Dec. 13, 2000); Confederated Tribes of
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In the 2011 Washington State legislative session, Representative John
McCoy introduced a bill that permitted the full or partial retrocession of
state criminal jurisdiction to the United States upon an Indian tribe’s
request.179 The bill required the Governor to issue a proclamation
retroceding state criminal jurisdiction if requested by the Indian tribe180
and acknowledged that retrocession would only become effective if
accepted by a duly designated officer of the United States
government.”181 The Secretary of the Interior is the officer designated to
accept a retrocession.182 A subsequent amendment—offered by
Representative McCoy—would have eliminated the Governor’s
obligation to issue a retrocession proclamation upon receipt of a request
from a tribe and instead provide her with discretion to approve a
retrocession petition and forward a proclamation to the Secretary of the
Interior.183 While the bill did not become law, there was tremendous
interest in the proposal from tribes, the U.S. Attorney’s office, and state
law enforcement entities. The premise of the proposed legislation was
that Indian tribes should have the choice whether to be subject to state
jurisdiction, and that it was unfair for Congress to allow state jurisdiction
without tribal consent.
The Governor, Speaker of the House, and President of the Senate
appointed a Joint Executive-Legislative Workgroup to consider
retrocession issues before the 2012 legislative session.184 A letter signed
by Governor Gregoire, House Speaker Frank Chopp, and Senate
President Lisa Brown explained:
It became apparent that retrocession is an issue of broad
importance to the tribes; federal, state and local governments;
and the citizenry of Washington. It also became apparent that
retrocession is not generally understood and that a coordinated
and focused effort would be necessary to give the issue the
the Chehalis Reservation, Quileute Indian Reservation, and Swinomish Tribal Community, 54 Fed.
Reg. 19,959 (May 9, 1989); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 8372
(Mar. 17, 1987); Suquamish (Port Madison), 37 Fed. Reg. 7353 (Apr. 13, 1972); Quinault Indian
Nation, 34 Fed. Reg. 14,288 (Aug. 30, 1969).
179. H.B. 1773, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
180. Id. § 3.
181. Id. § 4.
182. See Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968).
183. H.B. 1773, H. Amd. 343, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
184. See FINAL B. REP., E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2012). For information
about the task force see http://www.leg.wa.gov/jointcommittees/JELWGTR/Pages/default.aspx. The
Task Force included the author of this Article and Professor Douglas Nash of Seattle University
School of Law as academic advisors.
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attention it deserves and allow all affected parties an opportunity
to discuss and understand potential implications.
Accordingly, we have agreed to establish a Joint ExecutiveLegislative Workgroup on Tribal Retrocession.185
The twenty-member task force met four times between July and
November for in-depth discussions of the issues and development of a
draft bill. A wide variety of constituencies provided information and
advice to the task force, which discussed a draft bill at its final meeting
in November 2011.186 As a result, members of the State House and
Senate introduced identical bills at the start of the 2012 Session—House
Bill 2233187 and Senate Bill 6147.188 The 2012 version of the bill
included two major changes. First, it afforded the Governor discretion to
reject a tribal petition for retrocession, and second, allowed for
retrocession of civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. The new legislation
was approved in the Senate on March 5, 2012 by a vote of 42-6, and in
the House by a vote of 59-38 on March 6, 2012.189 It became effective
on June 7, 2012, ninety days after the Governor signed the bill, as
provided by state law.190
Washington’s 2012 retrocession legislation authorizes the Governor
to forward a proclamation for retrocession to the Secretary of the Interior
when certain conditions are met. While previous law permitted only the
partial retrocession of criminal jurisdiction and no retrocession of civil
jurisdiction (and now applies to only two of the four tribes that remain
subject to full state jurisdiction), the new legislation allows for
retrocession of “all or part of the civil and/or criminal jurisdiction
previously acquired by the state over a federally recognized Indian tribe,
and the Indian country of such tribe.”191 The process is commenced by a
tribal resolution and would be carried out in the following fashion:
(1) The governing body of a tribe submits a resolution to the
185. Letter from Christine O. Gregoire, Frank Chopp & Lisa Brown to Eric Johnson, Exec. Dir.,
Wash. State Ass’n of Cntys., (May 26, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review).
186. Joint Executive-Legislative Workgroup on Tribal Retrocession, WASH. STATE
LEGISLATURE,
http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JELWGTR/Documents/2011-11-16/
Agenda.pdf (Nov. 16, 2011). The agendas for all four meetings reveal the wide array of witnesses
who assisted the Task Force. WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, supra, at http://www.leg.wa.gov/
jointcommittees/JELWGTR/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
187. H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
188. S.B. 6417, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
189. FINAL B. REP., E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2012).
190. E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2012) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)).
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(1).
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Governor requesting retrocession with information regarding the
tribe’s plan to exercise jurisdiction after retrocession.192
(2) Within ninety days of receiving the resolution, the Governor
must convene a government-to-government meeting with the
tribal governing body or its designated representatives. The
Governor’s office must also consult with elected officials of
state political subdivisions located near the Indian tribe’s
territory.193
(3) The Governor has one year after receiving the tribal
resolution to approve or deny the request in whole or in part,
although extensions may be made for any term by agreement, or
unilaterally by either party for six months. Any denial of a tribal
request must be supported by reasons set out in writing by the
Governor. If accepted, a proclamation to that effect must be
issued and forwarded on to the Secretary of the Interior within
ten days.194
(4) Within 120 days of receiving the tribal resolution, but before
approving it, designated standing committees of each house in
the legislature must be notified, and they may have hearings and
make non-binding recommendations to the Governor.195
(5) The proclamation for retrocession will not be effective until
accepted by a “duly designated officer of the United States
government.”196
192. Id. § 37.12.160(2) (“The resolution must express the desire of the tribe for the retrocession
by the state of all or any measures or provisions of the civil and/or criminal jurisdiction acquired by
the state under this chapter over the Indian country and the members of such Indian tribe. Before a
tribe submits a retrocession resolution to the governor, the tribe and affected municipalities are
encouraged to collaborate in the adoption of interlocal agreements, or other collaborative
arrangements, with the goal of ensuring that the best interests of the tribe and the surrounding
communities are served by the retrocession process.”).
193. Id. § 37.12.160(3).
194. Id. § 37.12.160(4).
195. Id. § 37.12.160(5).
196. Id. § 37.12.160(6). This section also refers to “procedures established by the United States
for the approval of a proposed state retrocession.” Id. There are no formal procedures aside from the
delegation of authority from the President to the Secretary of the Interior, who must consult with the
United States Attorney General before accepting a retrocession and publishing the determination in
the Federal Register. Here is the Executive Order:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 465 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 9)
[§ 9 of this title] and as President of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby
designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the
President or of any other officer of the United States, any and all authority conferred upon the
United States by section 403(a) of the Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (25 U.S.C. 1323(a))
[subsection (a) of this section]: Provided, That acceptance of retrocession of all or any measure
of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or both, by the Secretary hereunder shall be effected by
publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of a notice which shall specify the jurisdiction
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(6) If the proclamation addressesjurisdiction over public roads,
the Governor must consider: (a) whether tribal interlocal
agreements exist with other jurisdictions that address uniformity
of motor vehicle operations in Indian country; (b) whether there
is a tribal police department to ensure safety; (c) whether the
tribe has traffic codes and courts; and (d) whether there are
appropriate traffic control devices in place.197
(7) The legislation contains savings clauses that reserve any
state jurisdiction over civil commitment of sexually violent
predators under state law,198 and ensures that cases commenced
in state courts or agencies prior to the effective date of a
retrocession may continue.199 It also provides that the tribes
covered by the existing partial retrocession scheme would
remain eligible to use that mechanism.200
The Joint Executive-Legislative Work Group on Tribal Retrocession
worked hard to understand the complex legal and policy issues
implicated in Indian country. The task force’s leadership received input
from state, federal, and tribal law experts to understand how tribal
desires for retrocession of state civil and criminal jurisdiction could best
be accomplished, and the effects of retrocession on both Indian and nonIndian parties. Those concerns were taken into account in a fashion that
provides for non-tribal input to a process that tribes may initiate and
present directly to the Governor.201 In the end, however, the Governor
retroceded and the effective date of the retrocession: Provided further, That acceptance of such
retrocession of criminal jurisdiction shall be effected only after consultation by the Secretary
with the Attorney General.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968); 25 U.S.C.A. § 1323 Note.
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(8). This section was the last amendment to the bill. An
earlier Senate amendment would have required the Governor (and in some cases other state
agencies) to certify that actions and agreements on the foregoing matters (including inter-local
agreements) were actually in place. E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 153, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2012). The House refused to concur in the Senate version and a Senate substitute bill was passed to
provide that the Governor should simply consider the issues in making her decision on a
retrocession proclamation. E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 282, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). This
version passed the Senate on March 5, 2012 and the House concurred on March 6, 2012. H.B. REP.
E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2012).
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.170(1).
199. Id. § 37.12.170(2).
200. Id. § 37.12.180. The preexisting partial retrocession is available for the two tribes that have
not utilized the partial retrocession process—Skokomish and Muckleshoot. Id. § 37.12.100.
Curiously, that statute does not extend to the other two tribes that requested full P.L. 280
jurisdiction under the 1957 statute: Squaxin Island and Nisqually. Id.
201. Id. § 37.12.160(2) (“Before a tribe submits a retrocession resolution to the governor, the
tribe and affected municipalities are encouraged to collaborate in the adoption of interlocal
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has discretion to accept to a tribal petition.
VI. THE MODERN SELF-DETERMINATION POLICY IS
INCOMPLETE WITHOUT TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO
INITIATE RETROCESSION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
A.

Washington’s 2012 Retrocession Legislation Is an Excellent Model
for Negotiating Jurisdiction in Indian Country

It should be apparent by now that criminal jurisdiction in Indian
country is unduly complex, and does not work very well. The regime is
governed by federal law, and was imposed generally without tribal
consent in a piecemeal fashion. Congress found in 2010 that:
The complicated jurisdictional scheme that exists in Indian country—
(A) has a significant negative impact on the ability to provide
public safety to Indian communities;
(B) has been increasingly exploited by criminals; and
(C) requires a high degree of commitment and cooperation
among tribal, Federal, and State law enforcement officials[.]202
In any given case, federal, tribal, and state police and prosecutors
determine jurisdiction in Indian country based on whether an Indian is
involved in a crime as defendant or victim,203 and the nature of the
offense. Indians may be federally prosecuted if they have committed an
offense included in the Major Crimes Act.204 Indians and non-Indians
alike are subject to prosecution under the Indian Country Crimes Act,
but subject to exceptions in the case of Indian-on-Indian crimes, in cases
of prosecutions of Indians already punished by a tribe, or in the case of a
specific treaty exception.205 Non-Indian versus non-Indian crime is left
to the states,206 unless it is also a violation of a general federal criminal

agreements, or other collaborative arrangements, with the goal of ensuring that the best interests of
the tribe and the surrounding communities are served by the retrocession process.”); id.
§ 37.12.160(8) (recommending state and local input regarding “the operation of motor vehicles
upon the public streets, alleys, roads, and highways” after retrocession).
202. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2262.
203. See supra Part II.A. For a discussion of the factors bearing on whether an individual is an
Indian for federal jurisdictional purposes, see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223–27 (9th
Cir. 2005) and Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV 1957 (2004).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see supra Part II.A.
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
206. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
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statute.207 P.L. 280 added to the complexity by transferring federal
criminal and civil jurisdiction to six “mandatory” states, and authorizing
other states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction at their option.208
The only empirical study of the transfer of jurisdiction to the states under
P.L. 280 demonstrates that it did not improve law enforcement in Indian
country, and in most cases, law enforcement services and tribal-state
relations declined.209 As explained above in Part IV, Washington State
assumed jurisdiction in a manner that passed rational basis review, but is
otherwise bewildering. Moreover, the jurisdictional arrangements
described above were not developed consistently with basic democratic
consent principles.210 Rather, they were imposed upon Indian tribes by
federal and state law in sporadic bursts. In recognition of this situation,
the Washington State Legislature took a significant step to reduce the
complexity of this arrangement by offering to surrender some of its
jurisdiction in accord with tribal desires.
Washington now has an excellent system to achieve retrocession at
the state and tribal level.211 The new law has deadlines and provides an
opportunity for all interested parties to have their interests heard in what
are essentially negotiations between petitioning tribes and the
Governor’s office. Professors Goldberg and Champagne have
thoroughly documented the difficulties tribes have encountered
achieving retrocession in other states when the only avenue runs directly
through the state legislature.212 When the group retrocession for fifteen
tribes in Nevada is excluded, there have only been sixteen discreet
campaigns for full or partial retrocessions of state jurisdiction.213 In
Nebraska, for example, the state legislature voted to retrocede most of its
jurisdiction on the Omaha reservation in 1969. However, almost
immediately after the Secretary of the Interior in 1970 accepted the
retrocession, Nebraska sought to revoke its retrocession.214 The
207. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the federal
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, “is a federal criminal statute of nationwide applicability, and
therefore applies equally to everyone everywhere within the United States, including Indians in
Indian country”).
208. See supra Part III.
209. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 176.
210. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
211. The approach originally advanced would be better as it would put the Washington tribes in
control of whether and how much jurisdiction should be retroceded by the state, albeit subject to the
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior to accept or reject the proffered retrocession.
212. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 264–68; CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 168.
213. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 266.
214. CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 169–70.
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Winnebago Tribe slowly built up its governmental infrastructure and
petitioned the Nebraska legislature in 1974 for retrocession of both civil
and criminal jurisdiction.215 An expensive and bruising political battle
ensued with state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 remaining intact.
Ultimately, Nebraska’s unicameral legislature voted to retrocede only
criminal jurisdiction on the Winnebago Reservation in 1985.216 A
political compromise had to be made by dropping the retrocession
request as to civil jurisdiction, with much of the opposition based on the
mistaken assumption that by retroceding civil jurisdiction, the tribe
would be receiving more authority.217
By contrast, Washington’s new approach provides a rational path for
considering retrocession and its effect on all the affected parties. The
legislature is not the place to work out the details of how retrocession
will work for a particular tribe, the state, and the federal government.
The legislature made the major policy decision to permit full or partial
retrocession to occur at the request of the tribe. It requires the Governor
to act on a tribal request under a one-year deadline so that inaction alone
cannot frustrate tribal wishes.218 Moreover, “[i]n the event the governor
denies all or part of the [tribal] resolution, the reasons for such denial
must be provided to the tribe in writing.”219 If the Governor issues the
requested proclamation, the crucial final step is convincing the Secretary

215. Id. at 171.
216. Id. at 172–74; see Gabriela Stern, Senators Give Winnebagos Jurisdiction, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Jan. 17, 1986 (recounting rancor and racism is the legislative effort to retrocede
jurisdiction). The headline from the Omaha World-Herald is premised on the common
misconception that retrocession of state jurisdiction bestows additional governmental powers on
affected tribes. It does not. Rather, it simply removes concurrent state jurisdiction.
217. Control of Civil Matters Called Next Logical Step, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 21, 1985.
The article quotes one opponent:
‘With civil retrocession, they would have the rule of the land,’ Freese said. ‘For example, they
could put a $500,000 tax on a tavern business, and you either pay it or you go out of business.
They could tax white-owned real estate. It could completely ruin the value of real estate.’
Id. The statement is absolutely incorrect as a matter of law. Tribal authority to tax non-members and
their property is governed by a federal common law test unaffected by the application of P.L. 280.
See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (striking down Navajo Nation’s tax on
non-Indian fee simple property).
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(4) (2012). There is no guarantee that a Governor will grant a
given retrocession petition, but one should expect good faith efforts to reach an accord.
219. Id. We will soon be able to see how this process plays out as the Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakama Reservation submitted retrocession resolutions to the Governor of
Washington in July 2012. Letter from Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation to
Governor Christine Gregoire (July 16, 2012) (attaching Yakama Tribal Council Resolutions T-11712 and T-036-12) (on file with Washington Law Review).
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of the Interior to accept the retrocession of state jurisdiction.220
One observer of the Washington process argues that while it
represents a good effort, “by placing the ultimate decision in the hands
of the Governor and mandating the inclusion of non-Indian governments
in the decision-making process, it does not truly place the power of
consent [to state jurisdiction] back in the hands of tribes.”221 While it
would be best for the legislature to place greater control in hands of the
tribes, such an outcome is unlikely in the foreseeable future for several
reasons. First, proposed legislation taking such an approach was
introduced in 2011, but the sponsor soon amended it to give the
Governor discretion whether to accept the proposed retrocession and the
bill still failed to move out of committee.222 Second, state and local
governing bodies surrendering jurisdiction will always insist on inserting
their views into the substance and manner in which their jurisdiction will
be affected.223 The ensuing dialogue may further understanding of tribal
justice systems, and lead to cooperative arrangements under state,
federal, and tribal laws that allow for mutual aid agreements and crossdeputization of law enforcement officers.224 Yet, while the new
legislation provides an opportunity for local government views to be
considered, the legislature wisely rejected amendments that would have
required the Governor to certify that certain intergovernmental
agreements were actually in place.225 This is good because it allows
220. It would be useful if the Department of the Interior developed at least some guidelines for
determining whether to accept a petition for retrocession. As it stands now, it is entirely an ad hoc
process. See infra notes 254–58 and accompanying text for a reasonable approach under the Indian
Child Welfare Act.
221. Leonhard, supra note 128, at 721. Nevada is the only state to offer unconditional
retrocession to any tribe that had not consented to state jurisdiction. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.430
(2011); see CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 184–87 (discussing Nevada’s retrocession scheme
in general and problems encountered by the Ely Colony); Acceptance of Offer to Retrocede
Jurisdiction, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,501 (June 24, 1975).
222. H.B. 1773, H. Amd. 343, 62d. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
223. There was little (if any) overt opposition to the retrocession as the Task Force worked
through the various issues. More typical were concerns expressed by the Washington State
Association of Counties and the Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. Both were interested
in ensuring efficient and coordinated service and law enforcement delivery after any retrocession.
Memorandum from Russell D. Hauge, Kitsap Prosecuting Attorney, to Sarah Lambert, Legislative
Assistant, Tribal Retrocession Work Group (Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review);
Letter from Wash. State Ass’n of Cntys. to Representative McCoy and Retrocession Work Group
(Oct. 10, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review).
224. See Tassie Hanna, Sam Deloria & Charles E. Trimble, The Commission on State-Tribal
Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 47 TULSA L. REV. 553,
592 (2012) (discussing the virtues of intergovernmental cooperation).
225. Compare E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 2233-S.E AMS ENGR S4848.E § 1(8) (passed Senate on
Feb. 28, 2012), with E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 282, 2233-S.E AMS PRID S5296.1 § 1(8) (passed
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Indian tribes to submit their retrocession petition when they feel they
have adequately consulted with state and local officials and can make
their case directly to the Governor.226 The consultation mandate and the
possibility for legislative hearings provide opportunities to explore all
issues of concern, but ultimately leave the negotiation process to the
Executive Branch of state government and the petitioning Indian tribe. It
also avoids giving local governments a veto. Rather, the consultation
provisions help the tribal, state, and local officials think through the
manner in which the shift in jurisdiction will be implemented, and the
practical consequences of the changes.
In fact, the negotiation process can facilitate better relations simply
due to the increased mutual understanding that develops through the
process. Indeed, several commentators have noted the benefits of tribalstate negotiations in a variety of contexts. The late David H. Getches
noted that “negotiated arrangements among governments concerning
jurisdiction and the provision of government services on Indian
reservations can give certainty and avoid the necessity of litigation.”227
As stated by Professor Frank Pommersheim: “Without talk and
conversation, there is no hope for the future of tribal-state relations. Yet
hope must also encourage the energetic dialogue that animates and gives
hope meaning in the first instance.”228 The goal is “to identify those
common interests that are better served by cooperation and coordination

Senate on Mar. 5, 2012). The engrossed Senate Bill of Feb. 28, 2012 contained the mandatory
certification language, which was rejected by the House and followed by the “striker” language of
March 5, 2012. A complete history of the bill’s amendments can be found at
http://dlr.leg.wa.gov/billsummary/default.aspx?bill=2233&year=2011.
226. If state agencies and local entities were left completely out of the process, they could be
expected to weigh in with their opposition at the stage when the Secretary of the Interior deliberates
whether to accept the retrocession petition. Cf. Letter from Russell D. Hauge, Kitsap Prosecuting
Attorney, to Governor Christine Gregoire (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with Washington Law Review)
(suggesting that the U.S. Attorney would not have adequate resources to prosecute non-Indians if
state authority over non-Indian versus Indian crimes were no longer subject to state authority).
227. David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American
Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 143 (1993).
Dean Getches also canvassed other federal efforts to encourage tribal-state compacting over
jurisdictional matters. Id. at 145–47; see also COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.05, at 589.
228. Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239,
276 (1991); see also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning and Negotiated
Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2010) (discussing how uncertainty in the water rights area
“has created an environment in which creative, practical solutions to conflicts have emerged in the
Indian water settlements approved by Congress”); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating
Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of
the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 373 (1994) (“Tribal-state negotiations can be comprehensive,
instead of piecemeal, as is inherent in case-by-case litigation.”).
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than competition and confrontation.”229
At the same time, a state process is not enough. For example, it
remains to be seen whether the Governor will accept a proffered tribal
request for retrocession. Governors should be expected to operate in
good faith, but tribes are in the position of supplicants seeking
restoration of a jurisdictional scheme that was altered without tribal
consent. Congressional action is therefore necessary and desirable to
reverse the effects of the unilateral grant of state authority under P.L.
280.
B.

Federal Law Should Be Changed to Provide a Tribally-Controlled
Process for Negotiating the Balance of Jurisdiction in Indian
Country

As noted at the outset of this Article, the consent of the governed has
a hallowed place in the United States’ system of government as well as
in emerging international law pertaining to indigenous peoples’ rights.230
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides that
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples . . . in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures
that may affect them.”231 As the brief historic survey of federal-statetribal relations set out in this Article reveals, the United Nations’ consent
paradigm has rarely been followed in federal Indian policy. One hundred
and fifty years of vacillating policies has left a legacy of many moral and
legal wrongs that must be undone. While it is not practically possible to
undo all of the harmful policies manifested in federal Indian law in one
fell swoop, the modern era has seen some encouraging steps that can
serve as a platform for constructing further improvements.
President Nixon repudiated the termination policy and ushered in an
era supportive of the federal-tribal relationship, announcing a new policy
of “self-determination without termination.”232 Congress followed suit
with the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975,233 which allows for the transfer of the administration of federal
229. Hanna, Deloria & Trimble, supra note 223. This Article provides a comprehensive history of
the efforts in the modern era to reach cooperative agreements in a wide variety of areas of concern
to tribes and local non-Indian governments.
230. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
231. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
232. H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 2 (1970).
233. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n,
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programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the tribes.234 That
program was augmented by the Self-Governance Acts of 1988,235
1994,236 and 2000,237 which establish flexible block grant systems for
tribal delivery of services the federal government would otherwise
provide.238 In a host of other statutes and administrative actions, the
United States today encourages and supports tribal governmental
institutions.239 These modern policies hearken back to the original tribalfederal relationship that provided ample room for the exercise of tribal
sovereignty within tribal territories.
While the earliest treaties reflected a desire for mutual peace and
intergovernmental respect, later treaties and agreements were geared to
the United States’ acquisition of land.240 In return, the United States
provided compensation in various forms. Most important from the
Indian perspective were the promises of permanent homelands and
recognition of the right to continue to exist as distinct sovereign
peoples.241 Federal intervention in internal tribal matters has a suspect
doctrinal pedigree, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much in
cases decided more than a century apart.242 In fact, Indian treaties and
treaty substitutes should be accorded quasi-constitutional status as they
stand as the only consent-based, and thus legitimate, source of federal
authority over Indian nations.243 The fact that the Supreme Court has
§§ 455–458e (2006)).
234. COHEN, supra note 2, § 22.02, at 1346–49.
235. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285
(1988).
236. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250.
237. Omnibus Indian Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 106–568, 114 Stat. 2868 (2000).
238. 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–458aaa-18.
239. See, e.g., Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of
2000, P.L. 106-464, 114 Stat. 2012 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4301(6)) (“[T]he United States has an
obligation to guard and preserve the sovereignty of Indian tribes in order to foster strong tribal
governments, Indian self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency among Indian tribes.”);
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (affirming the federal trust
responsibility to Indian tribes). An exhaustive discussion of federal programs supporting tribal selfgovernment and economic development can be found in COHEN, supra note 2, § 22, at 1335–1413.
240. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 102[1], at 16–17.
241. Id. § 1.03[6][a], at 64–65.
242. Compare United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (rejecting the Constitution’s Indian
Commerce Clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction over criminal jurisdiction in Indian country),
with United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“Congress’ legislative authority would rest in
part, not upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the Constitution’s adoption of
preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this
Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’”).
243. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
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upheld harsh treatment of tribal legal rights at times244 does not mean
that more enlightened treatment should not be forthcoming as a matter of
policy.
The self-determination policy, backstopped by the federal
government’s trust responsibility to Indian nations,245 is the way that the
United States’ promise of permanent tribal homelands under federal
protection is manifested in the twenty-first century. The return to tribal
control over criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country is an
essential component of this move to self-determination. States’ rights are
greatly valued in our federal system in order to facilitate legislative
experimentation and local control. Indian tribes are the third sovereign
mentioned in the Constitution. The same values favoring local control by
states apply with even greater force since the tribes did not have a hand
in the formation of the Constitution, and thus did not voluntarily submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the national government. In the course
of setting aside Georgia’s claim of authority over the Cherokee Nation,
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the “Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial.”246 Despite two centuries of inconsistent federal
policies and actions, Chief Justice Marshall’s recognition of Indian
autonomy and self-government is once again at the foundation of federal
policy. It has not, however, been manifested in the context of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country.
Professor Kevin Washburn of the University of New Mexico School
of Law underlined these issues when he described the federal criminal
jurisdictional patchwork in Indian country as a relic of repudiated
policies—an anomaly in the self-determination era. “The federal Indian
country criminal justice regime reflects the unilateral imposition, by an
external authority, of substantive criminal norms on separate and
independent communities without their consent and often against their

Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 406–17 (1993). As set out in the text
accompanying supra note 1, the consent principle is foundational to federal, state, and international
law.
244. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding unilateral abrogation of
Indian treaty despite promise that it would not be changed without the consent of three-fourths of
adult male Indians).
245. In Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), the Supreme Court
concluded that the United States “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust.” Id.
246. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
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will.”247 Professor Washburn concluded his analysis by suggesting that
Congress should consider an opt-out program for tribes for the removal
of federal jurisdiction to be replaced by sole tribal authority.248 While
Professor Washburn’s argument has merit, an even stronger case can be
made for congressional approval of legislation to authorize tribes to
remove state jurisdiction granted under P.L. 280. This is not a new idea.
In 1975, a bill was introduced that would have authorized tribes to
directly petition the Secretary of the Interior for the retrocession of state
jurisdiction acquired under P.L. 280.249 The states would have had no
role in the Secretary’s decision to accept a tribal retrocession request,
and the Secretary could only reject the petition if “(1) the tribe has no
applicable existing or proposed law and order code, or (2) the tribe has
no plan for fulfilling its responsibilities under the jurisdiction sought to
be reacquired or determined.”250 The bill never made it out of
committee, but it could serve as a starting point for congressional action
today. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 increased tribal authority
in sentencing, thus demonstrating Congress’s support for tribal courts.251
It also allows tribes in mandatory P.L. 280 states to request the
resumption of concurrent federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes
Act and Indian Country Crimes Act.252 In addition, the Tribal Law and
Order Act provides for appointment of tribal prosecutors to enforce
federal law in federal courts against Indians and non-Indians alike.253
While none of these provisions address the problem of unwanted state
jurisdiction, it demonstrates federal support for tribal wishes regarding
enhanced federal law enforcement.
Another approach short of tribally-mandated retrocession, suggested
by Professors Duane Champagne and Carole Goldberg,254 would be to

247. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV.
779, 782 (2006). Professor Washburn was confirmed by the Senate as the Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs on September 21, 2012. 158 CONG. REC. S6685 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2012); Press
Release, Dept. of Interior, Salazar Applauds Senate Confirmation of Kevin Washburn as Interior’s
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (Sept. 22, 2012), available at http://www.doi.gov/
news/pressreleases/Salazar-Applauds-Senate-Confirmation-of-Kevin-Washburn-as-InteriorsAssistant-Secretary-for-Indian-Affairs.cfm.
248. Washburn, supra note 247, at 853.
249. Indian Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1975, S. 2010, 94th Cong. (1975).
250. Id. § 103(c).
251. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(d) (2006); see supra note 86.
253. 25 U.S.C. § 2810(d) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006).
254. Professors Goldberg and Champagne are two of the leading authorities on P.L. 280 and
authors of the only empirical study on the effects of P.L. 280. FINAL REPORT, supra note 176.
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utilize the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) model, which permits
partial retrocession of state P.L. 280 jurisdiction in child custody
matters.255 In ICWA, a tribal petition to the Secretary of the Interior
initiates the retrocession process and the Secretary has limited discretion
to reject the petition.256 Moreover, if a tribal petition is denied, the
Secretary must help the tribe cure any defects in the tribal plan to
reassume exclusive jurisdiction.257 This is an effective approach as it
explicitly targets jurisdiction conferred by P.L. 280 and similar statutes.
While the Secretarial-approval role is somewhat paternalistic, the
petitioning tribe is generally in control of the process, and Congress
provided substantive standards to cabin the Secretary’s discretion.258 The
affected state has no formal role in the process.
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)259 provides yet another
model for intergovernmental cooperation in general, and respecting P.L.
280 jurisdiction in particular. Under IGRA, casino-style gaming on
Indian lands is prohibited unless an Indian tribe has reached an
agreement (compact) with the state where the land is located.260 It allows
Indian tribes to initiate negotiations in order to reach a tribal-state
compact that would govern the terms of the gaming.261 If the process
255. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 268–69. The ICWA of 1978 provides substantive
and procedural protection for the benefit of Indian tribes and Indian families. Chief among these are
provisions mandating the transfer of child custody proceedings from state to tribal courts at the
request of a tribe or Indian custodian. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2006); see Miss. Band of Choctaw v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
256. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to
the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by Title IV of the Act of
April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume
such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.”). Implementing
regulations are found at 25 C.F.R. pt. 13 (2012).
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(c) (“If the Secretary disapproves any petition under subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretary shall provide such technical assistance as may be necessary to enable the tribe
to correct any deficiency which the Secretary identified as a cause for disapproval.”).
258. Id. § 1918(b)(1) (“[T]he Secretary may consider, among other things: (i) whether or not the
tribe maintains a membership roll or alternative provision for clearly identifying the persons who
will be affected by the reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe; (ii) the size of the reservation or
former reservation area which will be affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by
the tribe; (iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population in homogeneous
communities or geographic areas; and (iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multitribal
occupation of a single reservation or geographic area.”).
259. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21).
260. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Casino style gaming is defined as “class III gaming” in IGRA. See
25 U.S.C. § 2703.
261. Id. § 2710(d).
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does not yield a compact, a judicially or administratively supervised
arbitration process is imposed.262 While this model is not perfect,263 it
has resulted in the greatest economic development in Indian country in
the history of the United States.264 The premise of IGRA was that Indian
tribes had a right to be free of state jurisdiction with respect to gaming
activities. The statute codifies that right while also providing for some
state involvement in the way gaming would occur. This has allowed
tribes and states to develop relatively harmonious relationships pursuant
to these intergovernmental compacts. The statute sets out items that may
be included in a compact.265 It also enumerates certain matters that may
not be the subject of negotiations, for example, states may not condition
their agreement on a tribal concession to state taxation.266 IGRA
expressly provides for the “allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction
between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of”
state or tribal laws directly related to “licensing and regulation of
[gaming].”267 The criminal law enforcement provisions of IGRA
preempt state gaming laws but authorize compact provisions to make
state law applicable.268 Tribal-state compacts in Washington generally
provide that Indian tribes shall be the primary enforcement and
regulatory authorities respecting Indian gaming, but also authorize state
enforcement of some state gambling laws.269 This Article does not
262. See id. § 2710(d)(7); 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.7–.11; Final Rule, Class III Gaming Procedures, 65
Fed. Reg. 17,535, 17,536 (Apr. 12, 1999) (explaining process).
263. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that judicial supervision
aspect may be barred by state sovereign immunity because Congress lacks power to waive state
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause). A regulatory avenue was developed in response to the
Supreme Court’s ruling. 25 C.F.R. pt. 291.
264. See Washburn, supra note 95, at 422 (“Indian gaming is simply the most successful
economic venture ever to occur consistently across a wide range of Indian reservations.”).
265. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
266. Id. § 2710(d)(4).
267. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(ii).
268. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006) (“The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this
section to Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved by the
Secretary of the Interior under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or under any
other provision of Federal law, has consented to the transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with
respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe.”).
269. See, e.g., Tribal-State Compact for Class III Gaming Between the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe
and the State of Washington, § 9, Wash.-Snoqualmie Tribe, Apr. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/compacts/Snoqualime%20Indian%2
0Tribe/snoqualmiecomp040402.pdf. All Tribal-State compacts are available from the National
Indian Gaming Commission at http://www.nigc.gov/Reading_Room/Compacts.aspx. Washington
also has a progressive tribal cross-deputization statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010); see
also supra note 73.
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advocate a P.L. 280 retrocession approach that would require state
agreement to remove the state jurisdiction granted by P.L. 280. Rather,
the compacting model simply provides an example of tribal-state
cooperation in criminal law enforcement matters when such negotiations
are authorized under federal law. It is interesting that many of the
Washington gaming compacts provide for a limited role of state law
enforcement—especially with respect to non-Indians. Presumably, this is
because an exclusive tribal and federal regime might create a practical
vacuum for minor criminal offenses committed by non-Indians. Tribal
criminal jurisdiction over such offenses would be barred by the Oliphant
rule,270 and prosecution of minor crimes by non-Indians is often a low
priority for federal prosecutors, or may fail for other reasons.271 A
successful negotiation process allows the parties to step back from
wooden, doctrinal positions and instead to focus on the substantive law
enforcement issues at hand, and how best to implement an effective
system in tribal territories.
The foregoing statutory schemes offer useful concepts for tribal
removal of unwanted state jurisdiction that should be part of a new
approach to P.L. 280 retrocession pursuant to federal law. While
imposing state jurisdiction on sovereign tribes without informed consent
was bad policy and morally wrong, Congress should not simply oust
state jurisdiction unilaterally. Instead, a better approach is one that melds
the ideas of encouraging negotiations and compacting as in IGRA, with
ultimate power in the tribes to petition the Secretary for a full or partial
removal of state jurisdiction as provided in ICWA. Consultation with the
affected state should be mandated at a minimal level to encourage
intergovernmental cooperation without imposing undue burdens or delay
on the petitioning tribe. Authorization of inter-governmental compacts
akin to IGRA may not be needed in all states, but if included as an
option, it would remove all doubt regarding the possibilities and legality
of voluntary intergovernmental arrangements. Time for negotiations
allows consideration of reliance interests, which are established by the
manner in which law enforcement and service delivery is now carried
out by tribal, state and federal authorities. Moreover, the sheer
complexity of the P.L. 280 jurisdictional scheme counsels in favor of a
deliberate process in which the affected governments can assess the
effect of retrocession on their resources and constituents. Any new
retrocession process must be developed in consultation with Indian

270. See text at infra notes 70–71.
271. Washburn, supra note 37, at 713–15.
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tribes and affected parties. The purpose of any substantive requirements
should simply look to an explanation of how retroceded jurisdiction
would be replaced. We live in the era of tribal self-determination. It is
time that tribes be given the option to remove that relic of the
termination era—P.L. 280.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides the reader with background information in the
field of federal Indian law and explains the complexities of criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. It demonstrates that the independence of
the Indian tribes at the time of the United States’ formation was well
accepted, and treaty making with the tribes was consistent with their
quasi-independent status after their involuntary incorporation into the
United States. The immunity of Indian tribes and their members from
state jurisdiction has a pedigree stretching back to the adoption of the
Constitution. P.L. 280 altered that situation in a dramatic way by
granting states jurisdiction without following the democratic consent
principle. As Senator Jackson noted in 1975, “[t]he Public Law 280
legislation was approved by Congress in the face of strenuous Indian
opposition and denied consent of the Indian tribes affected by the
Act . . . . The Indian community viewed the passage of Public Law 280
as an added dimension to the dreaded termination policy.”272
The complexity that resulted from the ill-conceived grant of authority
to the states by P.L. 280 actually decreased the effectiveness of law
enforcement in Indian country. The federal government repudiated
termination in 1970 in favor of the policy of tribal self-determination,
which continues, but P.L. 280’s intrusion into Indian country remains.
Washington State assumed P.L. 280 jurisdiction in an extremely
complex fashion and generally without the consent of Indian tribes. The
denial of tribal consent to the jurisdictional scheme on both the federal
and state levels is inconsistent with the notion that the consent of the
people is a bedrock principle of democracy in the United States.
The Article goes on to describe how Washington developed a state
retrocession statute that provides tribes with an innovative avenue to
remove unwanted state jurisdiction. Washington’s P.L. 280 retrocession
law marks a progressive step toward recognizing tribal sovereignty and
self-determination, but it does not go far enough because it still denies
tribes the power to remove jurisdiction asserted unilaterally. Congress
272. S. COMM. ON THE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND REP. ON
PUBLIC LAW 280 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman).
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should consider and pass legislation authorizing tribes to remove state
jurisdiction obtained under P.L. 280. Models that vest that power in the
tribes, but include opportunities for negotiated cooperative schemes, are
set out in the final section of the Article. Such approaches allow Indian
tribes the opportunity to develop arrangements that best promote
effective justice services and law enforcement in their jurisdictions.

